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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Relationship of Competition and Firms’ Price Responses.
(December 2010)
Sungbok Lee, B.S., Hankook University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Qi Li
This dissertation investigates the relationship of competition and firms’ price
responses, by analyzing: i) whether new entry reduces price discrimination, ii) when
incumbents reduce price discrimination preemptively in response to the threat of
entry, and iii) how competition increases prices. The dissertation consists of three
independent essays addressing each of the above questions. The first two essays
present an empirical analysis of the airline industry and the third essay presents a
theoretical analysis of the credit card industry.
In the empirical study of the relationship between competition and firms’ pricing
in the airline industry, I emphasize the importance of distinguishing the equilibrium
behaviors with respect to different market characteristics. Major airlines can price
discriminate differently in a market where they compete with low-cost carriers com-
paring to in another market where they don’t, and also they can respond differently
to the threat of entry depending on whether they are certain about the rival’s future
entry.
The study reveals that competition has a positive effect on price discrimination
in the routes where major airlines compete against one anther. In these routes,
competition reduces lower-end prices to a greater extent than upper-end prices. In
contrast, an entry by low-cost carriers results in a significant negative relationship
iv
between competition and price discrimination. Thus, the opposite results in the
literature are both evident in the airline industry, and it is very important to identify
the different forces of competition on price discrimination.
Firms can respond to potential competition as well as actual competition. So, I
extend the study to the relationship of potential competition and price discrimination,
specially in cases where major airlines compete against one another while facing
Southwest’s threat of entry. I also attempt to suggest major airlines’ motives of
reducing price discrimination preemptively. The results of the study suggest that
incumbents reduce price dispersion when it is possible to deter the rival’s entry and
that the potential rival discourages incumbents from deterring entry by announcing
before its beginning service.
Finally, I examine when competition can increase prices in a market, by analyzing
the issuing side of the credit card industry. This industry is characterized by a two-
sided market with a platform. Under the no-surcharge rule that restricts merchants
to set the same price for cash and card purchases, the equilibrium interchange fee
increases with competition. This occurs because issuers can compensate losses from
competing on the issuing side by collectively increasing the interchange fee. As a
result, limiting competition may improve social welfare when the interchange fee is
higher than the social optimal level. In contrast, in the absence of the no-surcharge
rule, the analysis shows that competition always improves social welfare by lowering
the price of the market.
vTo my parents,
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How prices are formed in oligopoly markets has been a central issue in the economic
discipline. In a monopoly market, a monopolist can (perfectly) price discriminate
according to consumers’ heterogeneous reservation prices, and so the prices will be
larger than or equal to the marginal cost. In a perfectly competitive market, no
firms can price discriminate and the price will be the lowest one which is equal to the
marginal cost of production. However, markets mostly lie between the two extreme
cases, and the relationship between competition and firms’ price responses is more
complicated.
This dissertation investigates the effects of competition on firms’ pricing in
oligopoly markets, by asking three specific questions as follow: i) does new entry
reduce price discrimination? ii) when do incumbents reduce price discrimination pre-
emptively in response to the threat of entry? and iii) how does competition increase
prices? The questions seem to contradict the conventional wisdom that competi-
tion always reduces firms’ market power in oligopoly markets so that prices fall, but
the results of this study enhance the reasoning behind the conventional wisdom of
competition.
Intuitively, as competition is intensified, it seems that the degree of price discrim-
ination is decreasing with competition and that the (average) price is also decreasing
with competition. Though, there are still debates on the relationship between com-
petition and firm’s responses in pricing. For instance, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)
contradict the results of Borenstein and Rose (1994) by showing that competition
This dissertation follows the style and format of Journal of Political Economy.
2has a negative effect on price dispersion, in line with the textbook treatment of price
discrimination.
In Chapter II, I reconcile the opposite results of the literature by recognizing
different forces of competition on price dispersion and by showing that both opposite
results are empirically evident, depending on the types of competitors in the market.
In the airline industry, low-cost carriers has brought lower prices and higher demand
over the several decades after the Airline Deregulation Act (1978). In this perspec-
tive, it is possible that major airlines price discriminate differently when they compete
with low-cost carriers from when they don’t. Like Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), the
results obtained from pooling all routes suggest that the negative effect of competi-
tion on price discrimination exists in all routes regardless of whether major airlines
don’t compete with low-cost carriers. The positive relationship between competition
and price disperion in Borenstein and Rose obtained from their analysis on the 11
major airlines in 1986. So, I test whether major airlines price discriminate differently
depending on whether they don’t compete with low-cost carriers.
I find that competition has a positive effect on price dispersion in the routes
where major airlines compete against one another, like the findings of Borenstein
and Rose. In these routes, major airlines rely on consumers’ cross-price elasticities or
brand loyalties in their discriminatory pricing when they compete against one another
so that a new entry of a major airline reduces lower-end prices much more than higher-
end prices. In contrast, competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in the
routes where major airlines compete with low-cost carriers, like the findings of Gerardi
and Shapiro. The opposite results are evident in the airline industry, which suggests
that the different forces of competition must be taken into account in analyzing the
relationship of competition and price dispersion.
Firms can respond to potential competition as well as actual competition. Though
3a rival has not yet entered a market, its threat of entry may induce incumbents to re-
spond preemptively by cutting prices or increasing investments. The airline industry
has been a free-entry (exit) market since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Many
studies have investigated whether a potential competitor servicing both endpoints of
a route can induce incumbents to cut prices before actual entry. In Chapter III, I also
extend the study to the relationship of potential competition and price dispersion,
especially in cases where major airlines compete against one another while facing the
threat of entry from Southwest airlines, a low-cost carrier.
I also attempt to uncover the reasoning behind major airlines’ preemptive reduc-
ing in price dispersion. If they reduce price dispersion responding to the rival’s threat
of entry, what motives drive them to reduce price dispersion preemptively? Goolsbee
and Syverson (2008) attempt to find the motives of preemptive responses, but their
results obtained from pooling all threatened routes do not clearly identify whether
incumbents are responding in order to deter or accommodate entry. If incumbents
don’t know about the rival’s future entry, they may choose to deter or accommodate
entry depending on which strategy is more profitable to incumbents. In this case, it
is difficult to identify the motives of preemptive responses because the equilibrium
strategic response in each route depends on the belief about the rival’s future entry
and because the beliefs are different across the threatened routes. Therefore, the
price cuts in the threatened routes could be seen as intended for either deterring or
accommodating entry.
If incumbents’ price cuts are motivated by uncertainty about a rival’s entry,
the rival also has motives to inform its entry earlier and to discourage incumbents
from entry deterrence by reducing price dispersion. Then, incumbents’ preemptive
responses may depend on whether they are informed about the potential rival’s entry.
The results suggest that incumbents reduce price dispersion in the routes which are
4still threatened by Southwest. In these routes, incumbents are uncertain about the
rival’s entry and believe they can profitably deter that entry, so they persistently
reduce price dispersion. In the routes which are once-threatened and entered by
Southwest, incumbents do not significantly reduce price dispersion responding to
Southwest’s presence in both endpoints. These routes are regarded as pre-announced
routes so that incumbents are certain about the rival’s entry. The overall results
suggest that Southwest discourages incumbents from pursuing a strategy of entry
deterrence by reducing price dispersion.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I examine when competition can increase the interchange
fee in the credit card market, focusing on the issuing side of the market. It is a
well-established economic principle that higher levels of competition lead to lower
prices. In the credit card industry, empirical evidence indicates that the interchange
fee increases with competition. The industry is characterized by a two-sided market
with a platform. So, the platform interconnects consumers and merchants by charging
the customer fee and the interchange fee, respectively. Under the no-surcharge rule
that restricts the merchants to set the same price for cash and card purchases, the
consumers are not informed of the interchange fee even though it is partly or fully
paid by the consumers. Thus, competition among issuers may not be effective in
reducing the interchange fee while lowering the customer fee.
In equilibrium, under the no-surcharge rule, issuers (members of the platform)
have a collective interest in setting the interchange fee such that all merchants accept
the credit cards. Since the issuers’ profits are increasing in the interchange fee, they
will set the largest interchange fee resulting in all merchants accepting the cards.
Subsequently, the paper shows that the interchange fee increases with competition
since issuers can compensate losses from competing on the issuing side by collectively
increasing the interchange fee.
5I show that limiting competition may increase social welfare. The issuers must
be a member of the association to provide its card payment services through the
platform, and so the association serves a barrier for entry and exit. That is, even
though the privately optimal number of issuers is less than the number of member
issuers, no issuers will exit the market as long as their profit is positive. As a result,
there will be too many issuers so that the customer fee is too low and the interchange
fee is too high. In this case, limiting competition improves social welfare.
If the no-surcharge rule restricts issuers to compete only over the customer fee,
lifting the no-surcharge rule may induce the issuers to compete over the total fee
including the interchange fee. Without the no-surcharge rule, the total fee of a card
payment service paid by the consumers decreases with competition among issuers. If
the issuers collectively determine the interchange fee even after the no-surcharge rule
is lifted, the privately optimal total fee is greater than the socially optimal level and
thus the card payment services are under-provisioned. It suggests that a fee policy
must be followed by abolishing the no-surcharge rule in this case.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II answers for the
first question by examining whether major airlines price discriminate differently when
they compete with low-cost carriers from when they don’t. Chapter III investigates
when firms reduce price dispersion preemptively, by disentangling the incumbents’
responses on price dispersion in the routes which are serviced by Southwest later
from those in the routes which are still threatened by Southwest. Chapter IV solves a
model of the credit card market to investigate how the interchange fee increases with
competition. Chapter V provides the conclusion of this study and discusses future
works.
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DOES COMPETITION ALWAYS REDUCE PRICE DISPERSION?
NEW ANALYSIS ON DIFFERENT FORCES OF COMPETITION IN
THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
Many economists agree that a firm in oligopoly settings can price discriminate when it
directly observes consumer heterogeneity or indirectly elicits it.1 However, they have
been still not agreed on whether price discrimination is persistent over increases in
competition. For instance, Borenstein and Rose (BR) (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro
(GS) (2009), the two seminal papers in the literature of price dispersion, investigate
the relationship between route competition and price dispersion in the U.S. domestic
airline industry, but their results are quite opposite on whether competition reduces
price dispersion.2
The paper investigates the same question by analyzing different forces of com-
petition in the U.S. domestic airline industry which is not examined in the literature.
The different forces of competition are sourced from whether or not major airlines
compete with low-cost carriers. The empirical results suggest that the findings of the
two studies are not contradictory, but both are evident in the airline industry.
The literature has mostly agreed with BR’s finding that competition has a pos-
itive effect on price dispersion. Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), in each in-
dependent theoretical paper, find that “segmenting consumers on the basis of their
1See Stole (2008) which discusses the relationship of price discrimination and com-
petition in depth.
2Price dispersion may not imply price discrimination if the dispersion is only be-
cause of cost differentials across consumers. The literature widely uses the term of
dispersion instead of discrimination.
7cross-elasticity of demand among brands typically will produce greater price disper-
sion if the market is more competitive.”3 Intuitively, as more firms enter the market,
firms compete on consumers who are relatively cross-price elastic. In a symmetric
equilibrium, though firms lose market power as the market gets more competitive, it
can be shown that the resulting price discrimination can increase with competition.
BR empirically test the hypothesis of a positive effect of competition on price
discrimination in a more general setting of Borenstein (1985).4 They show that a
positive effect of competition on price discrimination is significantly evident in the
U.S. airline domestic ticketing market. Subsequently, many economists have tested
whether a positive relationship is really evident in the airline industry or in other
price-discriminating industries. Busse and Rysman (2005) investigate yellow pages
advertising and Leslie (2004) did Broadway theater, and their findings are generally
consistent with BR’s findings
On the other hand, Lott and Roberts (1991) argue that observed price dispersion
may simply involve unrecognized cost variations, not generated from discriminatory
pricing. BR partly control for cost variations by considering systematic peak-load
pricing, which is not enough to control for all other cost variations from stochastic
peak-load pricing. Hayes and Ross (1998) support the argument of Lott and Roberts
(1991) by showing that “price dispersion in the domestic airline industry is mostly
related to peak-load pricing and the fare wars.”5
3See Borenstein and Rose (1994): This type of discrimination is referred to
“competitive-type” discrimination since firms depend on consumers’ heterogeneous
cross-price elasticities or brand loyalties. If firms rely on consumers’ reservation prices,
it is called as “monopoly-type” discrimination.
4The model considers multi-brand firms in order to fit the context of the domes-
tic airline industry where a brand stands for a flight in a route. Thus, it allows
asymmetric number of flights between firms.
5The fare wars were known to be related to financial difficulties of the early 1990.
Their sample includes fifteen carriers on 973 routes where runs for top 100 airports.
8Meanwhile, Stavins (2001) controls for cost variables by using the information
of Saturday-night stay-over and advance-purchase discounts.6 These restrictions may
have some effects on airlines’ cost which may not vary with the different degree of
competition. They find that “both restrictions are associated with lower fares, but
the discount decreases somewhat with market concentration.”
However, GS find that “competition has a negative effect on price dispersion,
in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination” and also suggest that
BR’s opposite finding from using cross-sectional date of 1986:Q2 could be reconciled
“by showing that the cross-sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias.”
They use panel data having 55 quarters from 1993:Q1 to 2006:Q3 which make it
possible to control for carrier-route-specific effects.7 If carrier-route-specific effects
are time-invariant and correlated to route competition, omitting them could result in
a (asymptotically) biased estimate from the regression. They show that plane size is
a possible omitted variable which is related to one of instrumental variables, route
distance, but the inclusion of plane size is not enough to correct other possible omitted
variable biases.8 As a result, they suggest that the fixed-effects panel estimation
method is appropriate to control for all other unobservable omitted variables and to
analyze the relationship of competition and price dispersion.
One thing common in Hayes and Ross (1998) and GS is that they include low-cost
The list of 6 non-major carriers is as follows: Aloha Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines,
Southwest Airlines, Trump Shuttle, Midwest Express, and Air Wisconsin.
6His sample includes 5,804 observations offered by 11 airlines on twelve routes on
the same day, September 28, 1995.
7GS’s cross-sectional estimates are generally consistent with BR’s results, which
suggests that the different time period does not explain the opposite results.
8In my replications of GS’s cross-sectional estimations, 23 positive estimates are
reversed into negative and mostly insignificant estimates after including plane size. 22
significant positive estimates are still positive but become insignificant after including
plane size.
9carriers (LCCs) in their analyses, which is different from BR. BR address that they
restrict the analysis to the 11 major U.S. airlines in 1986 to enhance comparability
across airlines. So, their sample would include routes where major airlines compete
against one another.9 Also, their selection of the 11 major airlines is in line with the
theoretical assumptions of Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989).10
On the other hand, GS intentionally include LCCs “because of the important role
that they have played in the airline industry” over the period of the sample. If LCCs
enter and compete with major airlines in all routes, the results obtained from pooling
all routes are treated as evidence for all routes. Though the route penetration of LCCs
has been increasing over time, there are still routes served by only major airlines
which are similar to the routes selected by BR. Thus, it is questionable whether
competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in BR’s selected routes, which
is not separately investigated in GS.
It is theoretically possible that major airlines price discriminate differently when
they compete with LCCs from when they don’t. In the context of Borenstein (1985)
and Holmes (1989), consumers may be more likely to switch to LCCs if they are able
to buy a ticket at a lower fare. That is, in a route where major airlines and LCCs
take off flights together, consumers may gain greater benefits by switching from major
airlines to LCCs. On the other hand, in a route where only major airlines provide
services, consumers have no theoretical benefits from switching airlines. As a result,
major airlines’ discriminatory pricing may be limited by entries of LCCs.
9They selected the 1,201 largest airport-pair routes which more than 80 percent
of the passengers traveled without a change of plane in 1986:Q2. And they chose the
11 major airlines so that 521 routes remained in the sample.
10The increasing price discrimination over competition is predicted at the equilib-
rium under the assumption that firms are homogeneous in cost. They also assume
that firms face symmetric demand functions. Stole (2008) refers these conditions to
best-response symmetry.
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Thus, the results from aggregating all types of routes and carriers in a pool
would be inconsistent unless the hypothesis is rejected. GS’s data can be classified
into three different types of routes: major-carrier routes, mixed-carrier routes, and
LCC routes. If major airlines compete against one another in a route, the route is
classified into a major-carrier route which is similar to BR’s selected routes. Then,
it can be tested whether competition also has a negative effect on price dispersion in
these major-carrier routes. Also, by comparing the results from major-carrier routes
with those from mixed-carrier routes, it can be examined which type of routes major
airlines produce greater price dispersion to a greater extent.
Another empirical issue arises from GS’s model specification. They follow BR’s
specification for the cross-sectional analysis as much as possible, and they believe
that the specification would not be different across route types. Of course, with
the specification, they suggest that the positive omitted variable biases are evident
in all routes, showing that the cross-sectional estimates on route competition may
be positively biased. If major airlines in mixed-carrier routes treat LCCs as other
major airlines, their responses will be consistent with those in major-carrier routes.
So, the biases should be observed in both of major-carrier and mixed-carrier routes.
However, it is likely that the model for mixed-carrier routes has to be more specified in
controlling for asymmetric responses between majors and LCCs than in major-carrier
routes. Thus, it is testable whether the omitted variable biases are large enough to
reverse the cross-sectional estimate in both types of routes.
Following the previous airline studies and the definition of Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), 8 legacy airlines are classified into major airlines (majors) and the
rest of carriers into LCCs. According to carrier types, three types of routes are classi-
fied as described above. If the total quarterly market share of LCCs in a route is more
than 5 percent, the route is named as a mixed-carrier route. For the panel analysis, a
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route is classified into a major-carrier route if the route has never been mixed-carrier
or LCC routes during the sample period. LCC routes are also classified in the same
way. And all other transitional routes which have ever been changed into other types
of routes are treated as mixed-carrier routes.
By introducing the market classification, competition has a positive effect on
price dispersion in major-carrier routes. The results hold in other similar market
classifications. Though the cross-sectional estimators suffer from omitted variable
biases found by Gerardi and Shapiro, the biases are not large enough to reverse the
positive relationship in the major-carrier routes. It is in the mixed-carrier routes that
the omitted variable biases evidently reverse the negative estimated effect of compe-
tition on price dispersion into the positive. This suggest that GS’s findings explain
a part of industry, the mixed-carrier routes, and the inclusion of LCCs without the
market classification may mislead to the result that the negative effect of competition
on price dispersion is prevalent in all routes.
Furthermore, majors in the major-carrier routes compete on consumers with
higher cross-price elasticities while LCCs compete on consumers with high reservation
prices. Thus, in the mixed-carrier routes where both types of carrier compete together,
competition reduces higher-end prices much greater than lower-end prices. In line
with these findings, the empirical results consistently suggest that majors in the
major-carrier routes are price discriminating more than in the mixed-carrier routes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Subsection B describes how
the data are subsampled to reflect the different forces of competition on price disper-
sion according to the types of route, and discusses empirical specifications. Subsection
C reports all results of estimations. Finally, in Subsection D, the primary findings
are summarized and the limits of the paper are discussed.
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B. Data and Market Classification
The domestic airline industry has evolved through the emergence of LCCs. Even in
the second quarter of 1986, LCCs were threats to major full-service airlines. However,
at that time, the effect of LCCs would not be very significant on the pricing of
major full-service airlines. In the record, LCCs account for about 10 percent of
passengers in 1990, but they account for 30 percent of passengers in 2009. The
drastic increases in the LCCs’ total market share in the domestic market must have
been reflected in the pricing of majors. If LCCs are prevalent in all routes, it is
not necessary to classify route types for distinguishing different forces of competition
on price dispersion. However, there are still about one fifth of routes where LCCs
do not provide direct flights in 2006:Q3. Thus, it is testable whether majors price
discriminate differently when they compete with LCCs from when they don’t.
The recent data set processed by GS is used in the analysis, which are generated
from the DB1B and T-100 domestic direct segments. The DB1B data are a 10 percent
random sample of all domestic tickets, and the T-100 data contain ticket information
on domestic nonstop flights. GS’s sample covers domestic, direct, directional, and
coach-class airline tickets over the period of 1993:Q1 - 2006:Q3.11 The recent data
are not included to keep the consistency of the data.12 Some variables are added for
defining route types and for applying BR’s sample criteria to GS’s sample.13
11GS addressed the issue of double counting since a route is defined as a directional
trip and any round-trip would count twice. For instance, a round-trip fare from
Phoenix to Philadelphia would appear twice as PHX-PHL and also as PHL-PHX.
They decide to drop one of the directions since double counting would have no effect
on the consistency of estimates but would increase the size of the standard errors.
Meanwhile, I revise GS’s dummy variable for dropping one direction of routes in order
to correct some misclassified observations.
12The most recent DB1B and T-100 data are released at http://www.transtats.
bts.gov.
13Thank Gerardi and Shapiro for privately providing their data-processing STATA
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1. Carrier Type
It is well-known that there are three types of carriers in the U.S. domestic airline
industry: major, low-cost, and regional airlines.14 Regional airlines are treated as
LCCs and code-sharing flights of regional airlines are dropped in the sample. For
analyzing the different effects of competition on price dispersion according to com-
petitors’ carrier types, full-service network airlines are classified into major airlines
in that they are distinguishable from LCCs in terms of cost structure. Currently, 8
airlines are listed as full-service network airlines by the DOT: American, Continental,
Delta, Northwest, United, USAir, TWA, and Alaska. These airlines are also called
by legacy airlines in that they existed prior to the Airline Deregulation Act (1978)
(ADA) and are burdened by ‘legacy’ fleets, relatively expensive labor contracts, and
organizational structures.
LCCs are different from majors in that they are characterized by a single pas-
senger class, standardized aircraft utilization, limited in-flight services, use of smaller
and less expensive airports, and lower employee wages and benefits. GS list 9 majors
including America West in their analysis, but I decide to exclude America West in
the list of majors. It was established in 1981 after the ADA, and it has been also
classified as a LCC by the DOT before merging into USAir in 2006.15 Thus, America
and Matlab codes. The variables for market classification and sampling criteria are
generated by using the codes of GS.
14The term of ‘major’ is not adequate in the classification of carrier types since it
does not explain differences across carrier types. For instance, Southwest is not only
a well-known LCC but also a major airline by the DOT definition. If an airline’s
operating revenue is over $1 million in a fiscal year, it is classified as a major airline
by the DOT.
15Meanwhile, the DOT defined America West as a network airline in 1997 despite
the fact that it has a lower operating expense per seat mile than at least 3 LCCs:
Airtran Airways, Western Pacific, and Vangaurd. See Reynolds-Feighan (2001) for
more details. Also, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) don’t include America West as a
major airline in their analysis of 1993:Q1 - 2004:Q4.
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Fig. 1.—Trends of Carrier Types
West is counted as one of LCCs.16
During the period of 1993:Q1 - 2006:Q3, more than 200 carriers are uniquely
observed after the DB1B data are filtered into direct flights. 8 major, 19 low-cost,
and 38 regional airlines remain in the final data set that merged While the filtered
DB1B data and the T-100 data. One of the reasons is because a direct flight in the
DB1B data would not be recorded in the T-100 data.17 Figure 1 indicates the trends
of carrier types over the period. Though 19 LCCs were recorded in the sample, at
average 9 LCCs take off direct flights during the period. About 12 - 16 regional airlines
operated in direct routes before 1998:Q1, and then, around 7 regional airlines had
operated in direct routes until 2005:Q1. The introduction of ‘regional jet’ in 1997
contributed to reducing regional airlines’ direct flights and increasing code-sharing
16See Ito and Lee (2003) for the detailed list of LCCs.
17See Goolsbee and Syverson (2008)
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Fig. 2.—LCC’s Route Penetration
flights to serve the hubs of majors. Around 11 regional airlines have provided direct
services from 2005:Q1.
The number of routes serviced by LCCs has been tripled by about 455 routes
over the period while the route number by majors has decreased by about 365 routes.
Figure 2 indicates how many routes have been penetrated by LCCs, and that the
trend of LCCs’ route penetration seems to keep increasing.18
2. Route Type
According to carrier types, the types of routes are classified corresponding to possible
different forces of competition on incumbents. The different forces of competition on
incumbents may depend on whether carriers in a route compete with the same type
of carriers or not. For the cross-sectional estimations, if the quarterly market share
18Without losing data from merging the DB1B and T-100 data, the decreasing
trend of routes served by majors is more downward-sloping.
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Fig. 3.—Quarterly Trends of Airport-Pair Route Types
of LCCs is less than 5 percent in a route, majors must be competing against one
another. The route is classified into a major-carrier route. If the quarterly market
share of majors is less than 5 percent in a route, LCCs must be competing against
one another. The route is called into a low-cost-carrier (LCC) route. If a route does
not meet the above two criteria, the route is classified into a mixed-carrier route.19
Figure 3 shows that the number of major-carrier routes has been decreasing from
1,029 route in 1993:Q2 to 556 routes in 2006:Q3 whereas the number of mixed-carrier
routes has been increasing by 167 routes. Also, the number of LCC routes has been
19The 10 percent cutoff is examined since there is no rule of thumb for the cutoff
of market share. The cutoff of the market share is consistent with the findings of the
DOT (1996) in some sense. It analyzes the entry effects of LCCs on Delta’s ticket
prices in Salt Lake City and Atlanta routes. Deltas fares fell 33 percent where it
competes with Morris Air but did not either rise or fall on routes where Morris Air
did not compete in Salt Lake City routes. On the other hand, Deltas fares changed
only modestly after ValueJet entries in Salt Lake City routes. The only difference is
that ValueJet achieved relatively lower market share in Atlanta routes than Morris
did in Salt Lake City routes.
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TABLE I
Quarterly and Over-the-Period Types of Routes
(Number of Unique Routes)
0 ↔ 0 1 ↔ 1 2 ↔ 2 0 ↔ 1 0 ↔ 2 1 ↔ 2 0 ↔ 1 ↔ 2
major-carrier (0) 498 0 0 659 69 0 362
mixed-carrier (1) 0 32 0 583 0 112 507
LCC (2) 0 0 249 0 149 134 532
increasing by 356 routes, which is more than the increase in the number of mixed-
carrier routes during the same period. One of possible reasons is because majors tend
to discontinue their direct flights when LCCs begin direct services.
Since the panel data is also analyzed in the paper, the three types of routes are
also defined for the panel analysis. If a route has never been mixed-carrier or LCC
routes, the route is named as a major-carrier route. Also, a route is named as a LCC
route if the route has never been major-carrier or mixed-carrier routes. If a route
does not meet both criteria, the route is classified as a mixed-carrier route.
Table I summarizes the seven transitions of rout types over the period. In the
routes of 0↔ 2, majors tend to discontinue direct flights when LCCs like SouthWest,
JetBlue, Airtran Airways, and Frontier start to provide direct flights. In the routes
of 1 ↔ 2 as well as 0 ↔ 1 ↔ 2, majors such as Continental, Delta, American, and
Northwest have discontinued or reduced direct flights over time.
The direct-passenger ratio in a route is also considered for sampling the data.
Considering that at least one-stop flights could be close substitutes to non-stop flights,
the direct-passenger ratio would indirectly control for the effects of indirect flights.
BR selected routes which more than 80 percent of the passengers traveled without
a change of plane in the 1,201 largest airport-pair markets. The same criterion is
applied in selecting routes for the cross-sectional analysis by using the DB1B data.
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In the panel analysis, a route is dropped if the average ratio of direct passengers in
the route is less than 75 percent over the period.
Finally, a market is defined by airport-pair endpoints to enhance comparability
across studies. A market could be defined by city-pair since LCCs tend to enter into
smaller airports in multi-airports areas. Then, the city-pair route could measure the
degree of competition more exactly while airport-specific variables may be diluted.
To consider the effect of defining a route by city-pair, the numbers of each type of
firms are counted by city-pair as a way of measuring the degree of competition.20 As
a result, 111,098 carrier-route observations remain in the final sample. It covers 2,558
unique airport-pair routes.
C. Empirical Analysis
1. Model Specifications
1.1. Cross-Section
The model for cross-sectional estimations follows GS’s cross-sectional specification.
The Gini log-odds ratio given by Glodd = lnG/(1−G) is a measure for price disper-
sion.21
20Interestingly, majors service multiple airports in most of the 10 Metropolitan
areas, and LCCs also tend to service multiple airports in those areas if possible. The
10 metropolitan areas are used in defining city-pair routes: Chicago(MDW, ORD),
Dallas(DFW, DAL), Detroit(DTW, DET), Houston(IAH, HOU), LA(LAX, ONT,
BUR, LGB, SNA), Charlotte(CLT, GSP), New York(JFK, LGA, ISP, EWR, HPN),
San Fransico(SFO, OAK, SJC), Miami(MIA, FLL) and Washington DC(DCA, IAD,
BWI) For instance, Southwest takes off its direct flights in multiple airports of the
five Metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, Dallas, Houston). Thus,
the estimation results may not depend on the alternative market definition.
21The Gini-coefficient G follows the calculation of Borenstein and Rose (1994). See
Appendix A. The log-odds ratio produces an unbounded statistic whereas the Gini
coefficient is bounded between zero and one.
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The cross-sectional model is
Gloddij = β0 − β1 ln ĤERF j + β2 ln ̂MKTSHAREij + β3 ln ̂FLTTOTj
+β4 lnTOURIST j + β5HUBij + β6SMALLj (2.1)
+β7 ln ̂ASEATCAP ij + αi + γj + εij
where where i indexes the carrier and j the route.
Like BR and GS, I treat carrier-specific effects αj as fixed and route-specific ef-
fects γj as random. The degree of competition on a route is measured by the Herfind-
ahl index, − lnHERF j. The larger value of − lnHERF j indicates the higher compe-
tition in a given route. The market share of a given carrier in a route, lnMKTSHAREij,
may explain the effect of the carrier’s relative market power on its price dispersion
in the route. The market share is measured by the proportion of passengers, and
subsequently used in measuring the Herfindahl index.
The variable FLTTOT is the total number of flights on a route. It is included
as a proxy for market density. An increase in market density is likely to lower the
shadow value of capacity but increase the demand uncertainty for any given flight on
the route, resulting in reducing price discrimination.22 TOURIST , the maximum of
the ratio of accommodation earnings to total non-farm earnings for the origin and
destination airports, is included as a proxy for consumer heterogeneity. An increase in
TOURIST indicates that consumers are closer to homogeneous ones so that a carrier
would lose its discriminatory power. HUB is a dummy variable indicating whether
the origin or the destination is a hub airport for the given carrier, which controls for
a carrier’s hub dominance. SMALL is a dummy variable equal to one if the route
22In a monopoly route, the predicted effect of market density could be positive on
price dispersion if the increased number of flights plays a role of increasing monopoly
power to price discriminate.
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does not include a big city, which is a proxy of a congested route. However, it should
be careful to interpret the coefficient on SMALL since the variable SMALL may
not indicate that big cities are always congested.23
Finally, as GS show that plane size is one of possible omitted variables in the
cross-sectional estimations, lnASEATCAP is explicitly included in the model since
plane size is one of the determinants of price dispersion and also is related to included
variables or instrumental variables. Of course, whether the inclusion of plane size
has a similar effect in any type of routes will be examined as one way of looking
at the omitted variable problems. − lnHERF , lnMKTSHARE, lnFLTTOT , and
lnASEATCAP are instrumented by using the same instruments as GS; these include
route distance, two versions of mean population, total enplaned passengers, and the
other two variables.24 The hats on these variables denote instrumented variables.
Since the three types of routes and two types of carriers are classified, there
would be four single cross-sectional estimations: (1) majors in major-carrier routes,
(2) majors in mixed-carrier routes, (3) LCCs in mixed-carrier routes, and (4) LCCs
in LCC routes. It is usual that joint estimation is asymptotically more efficient than
single estimation for each group. However, if there are misspecification problems as
GS showed, the joint estimation may increase misspecification biases even in single
estimations which are not actually misspecified.25 Furthermore, since carrier-specific
and route-specific effects are controlled in the estimations, the four single estimations
may be unrelated so that single estimations can be justified.
GS performed the quarterly cross-sectional estimations which implicitly assume
23BR use the list of 24 congested airports for the variable SMALL while GS select
40 big airports
24See Appendix A for more details, and also see Borenstein and Rose (1994) and
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
25See Hayashi (2000).
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that all coefficients are different over time, in order to compare their results to BS’s.
It is not clear whether the differences across the quarterly estimates come from the
industry’s structural changes or the differences in quarterly data. If the structural
changes are not significant, the estimates would be more consistent if they are ob-
tained from pooling all quarterly data or gradually adding quarterly data at each
time. Thus, these three different approaches are examined.26 When the latter two
cross-sectional approaches are estimated, the time dummies are included to control
for exogenous shocks over the industry.
1.2. Panel
A panel specification can be written like the cross-sectional model (2.1):
Gloddijt = β0 − β1 ln ĤERF jt + β2 ln ̂MKTSHAREijt + β3 ln ̂FLTTOTjt
+β4 lnTOURIST jt + β5HUBijt + β6SMALLjt (2.2)
+β7 ln ̂ASEATCAP ijt + αi + γj + εijt.
The fixed-effects panel specification is driven by within-transforming the equation
(2.2). The within transformation results in dropping time-invariant variables, but
rarely-changing variables remain so that they may increase the inefficiency of the
fixed-effects estimates.27
26For brevity, the results obtained from quarterly and rolling estimations are re-
ported in Appendix B.
27For instance, in a simple univariate regression with a rarely-changing variable X1,
the asymptotic variance of the fixed-effects estimator can be written as
̂Avar(βˆFE) = σ2ε(X ′1MDX1)−1,
where MD is the matrix that takes deviations fro the over-time means X¯1. If there
is another variable X2 which is varying over time, the estimate for X2 will be less
efficient than in the estimation dropping the rarely-changing variable X1. The within-
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The variables lnTOURIST , HUB and SMALL are rarely-changing variables so
that they are not included in the panel analysis. Also, the variable lnASEATCAP
is not included in the panel analysis since the over-time variations of carrier i’s plane
size in a given route are mostly attributed to a new introduction of fleet rather than
strategical responses to new entries.28
GS exclude the variable lnMKTSHARE and lnFLTTOT in the panel analysis
since they “do not vary much within a carrier-route observation over time or do not
exhibit independent variation from the competition variables.” Simply, these two
variables are dropped to keep the comparability across studies.29 The panel model
follows GS’s specification:
Gloddijt = β0 − β1 ln ĤERF jt + β2Bankruptit + τt + νij + εijt (2.3)
where τt indicates time dummies to control for exogenous events on cost variables and
cyclical demand effects, and the dummy Bankrupt is to control for carrier-specific
events on price dispersion. As GS pointed out, there could be other carrier’s unob-
servable carrier-specific shocks that affect all prices over all of the routes serviced by
the carrier. The standard errors are clustered by route to control for serial correlation
and correlation across carriers on the same route.
To see if there are omitted variable biases which reverse the sign of the cross-
transformed variables, MDX1 and MDX2, are not highly correlated since the varia-
tions of X1 are sourced from the over-time means across individuals while the varia-
tions of X2 are also from the within-transformed values.
28Ito and Lee (2003) found that it is not evident that incumbents are not affected
in deciding plane size in a given route by a new entry or the entrant’s decision of
plane size.
29I also examine what are the effects of dropping or including these two variables in
the panel analysis. As a result, it turns out that omitting these variables only slightly
affects the estimates for − ln ĤERF , but increases the efficiency rather than in any
combinations. The estimation results are not reported, but they may be provided by
request.
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sectional estimates on − lnHERF in each single estimation, four single estimations
are also performed in the panel analysis. For a robustness purpose of the panel
analysis, the estimates on three different measures for route competition are also
compared. The three measures are the Herfindahl index, the total number of carriers,
and the number of legacy airlines and LCCs. The first two measures are − lnHERF
and N (total number of carriers) measured by airport-pair route while the last are
NLEG (number of majors) and NLCC (number of LCCs) by city-pair route.30
Finally, the price percentile regressions are performed by using the 10th, 20th,
80th and 90th price percentiles as independent variable instead of the log-odds ratio
of Gini coefficient:
lnP (k)ijt = β0 − β1 ln ĤERF jt + β2Bankruptit + τt + νij + εijt (2.4)
where P (k) indicates the kth percentile of the prices. The percentile regressions pro-
vide information on the effects on the tails of the price distribution rather than on
a measure for price dispersion. The Gini log-odds ratio regression does not distin-
guish the direction of the effects of competition on price dispersion. For instance,
a positive estimate on route competition in the Gini log-odds ratio regression could
explain differently about the relationship of competition and market power to price
discriminate.31 That is, the results from the price percentile regressions can be more
explaining the behaviors of discriminatory pricing in the airline industry.
30In counting NLCC , regional carriers are not included. Since America West as
classified into one of LCCs in the analysis, the numbers of majors and LCCs are a
little different from GS’s.
31A positive estimate on competition may indicate that the higher-end prices in-
crease with competition.
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2. Estimation Results
The results of using the two different samples respectively chosen by BR and GS are
compared to see if the fixed-effects estimates on competition are consistent between
the two studies. GS aggregate all routes in a pool while BR select routes where
majors would compete against one another. If the negative effect of competition on
price dispersion is evident in all routes, the fixed-effects estimate from using major-
carrier routes would be negative. If they are not significantly consistent in sign,
pooling all types of routes may mislead into believing that the negative relationship
between competition and price dispersion founded by GS are evident in all routes.
Assuming that majors are different from LCCs in terms of cost structure, majors
may respond differently to competitors’ types. If it is not rejected, the results of
GS could be because of pooling different types of routes or pooling different types
of carriers. To test whether majors price discriminate differently when they compete
with LCCs from when they don’t, the four single fixed-effect panel estimations are
performed by using the market classification. Hausman tests are performed to see if
there are significant omitted variable problems in each single regression. Finally, the
results from the pooled cross-sectional estimation are provided to examine the effects
of other variables on price dispersion according to the market classification.
2.1. Comparisons of the Two Studies
Table II reports the results obtained from using the three different measures of com-
petition as dependent variable, respectively. The first three columns are obtained by
using observations of all routes, whereas the last three columns by using observations
of majors in major-carrier routes which are similar to the routes selected by BR.
If there are omitted variable problems in the cross-sectional estimations in all
25
routes and the fixed-effects approach corrects the misspecification, the results of the
two different approaches must be consistent. GS show that the estimate on route
competition is significantly negative in the fixed-effect panel regression for all routes.
The estimates from the first three column are generally consistent with the results
in GS. The differences from those of GS’s original sample are because the dummy
for dropping one direction of routes is updated and the routes not satisfied with the
direct-ratio criterion are dropped. The estimates on − ln ĤERF and ln Nˆ are −0.117
and −0.196, respectively, and both are significant at 1 percent level.
Meanwhile, the estimates on the number of majors and on the number of LCCs
in the third column of Table II give some messages where the negative effect of
competition comes from. Indeed, GS show that the negative effect of competition
on price dispersion are sourced from changes in competition by LCCs, but they do
not extend these results to a possibility that there would not be a negative effect
of competition on price dispersion if a route is not serviced by LCCs.32 Rather, by
pooling all routes in the regressions, they suggest that the number of LCCs has a
much larger negative effect on price dispersion than the number of majors.
On the other hand, the results in the last three columns of Table II indicate that
the negative effect of competition on price dispersion is not evident in the major-
carrier routes. The estimates for − ln ĤERF and ln N̂ are positive but insignificant
while the estimated effect of NLEG is 0.009, significant at 5 percent level. These
results suggest that the effect of competition on price dispersion could be positive
as BR found in their analysis. The omitted variable biases, corrected here through
the use of the fixed-effects, would not be large enough to flip the relationship of
32They also obtained an insignificant estimate on the number of majors and a
significantly negative estimate on the number of LCCs in the regressions reported in
their Table 2. Please see Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
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TABLE II
GS’s Approach vs. BR’s Approach: Fixed-Effects Panel Estimates
(Dependent Variable: Gloddij )
GS’s Approach BR’s Approach
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
− ln ĤERF -0.117*** 0.097
(0.023) (0.062)
ln N̂ -0.196*** 0.078
(0.035) (0.086)
NLEG 0.001 0.009**
(0.002) (0.005)
NLCC -0.016*** -0.004
(0.005) (0.015)
Observations 110,160 110,160 110,164 20,645 20,645 20,646
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies, quarter dummies, and a dummy variable for bankruptcy. The
carrier-route-specific effects are treated as fixed. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
competition and price dispersion in the major-carrier routes.
GS reconcile the opposite results on route competition in the cross-sectional
and fixed-effects panel estimation by showing that the cross-sectional estimates could
be biased due to omitting variables. They suggest that plane size is one of possible
omitted variables which is correlated with route distance, one of instruments, and that
route distance is also correlated with competition. Demand for air travel increases
with long distance, and the sample somewhat reveals positive correlation between
the two variables, so omitting plane size results in an asymptotically and positively
biased estimate for route competition.
Figure 4 displays the quarterly cross-sectional estimates on route competition
obtained from using observations of all routes, comparing the estimates before and
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Fig. 4.—Quarterly Cross-Sectional Estimates for Competition: All Routes
after including plane size.33 The estimates significantly fall with the inclusion of plane
size, but they are mostly insignificant. The colored area indicates the confidence
interval at 95 percent level. 36 positive estimates among 50 positive estimates are
significant at 10 percent level or less before the inclusion of plane size whereas 41
estimates become insignificant after the inclusion of plane size.
Figure 5 indicates that the corrections by the inclusion of plane size are very slight
in the regressions for the major-carrier routes. The estimates on route competition
mostly remain positive and significant even after the inclusion of plane size. The
sample of the major-carrier routes reveals a weaker correlation between plane size
and route distance relative to the correlation between route distance and competition.
33The differences from the original cross-sectional estimations of GS are from the
altered dummy for dropping one direction of routes and the sample selection of using
the ratio of direct flights.
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Fig. 5.— Quarterly Cross-Sectional Estimates for Competition: Major-carrier
Routes
The results of Table II and Figure 5 suggest that the omitted variable biases are not
large enough to change the positive sign of the estimate on route competition in the
regressions for the major-carrier routes. Competition has a positive effect on price
dispersion when majors compete against one anther, not with LCCs.
2.2. Pooling Route or Carrier Types
Table III reports the estimation results from (1) pooling all, (2) pooling route types
for major carriers, (3) pooling route types for LCCs, (4) pooling carriers for non-
mixed-carrier routes, and (5) pooling carriers for mixed-carrier routes. In the second
and third columns of Table III, it is assumed that different types of carriers would
be different on price discrimination while the same type of carriers are homogeneous
regardless of which types of carriers they compete with. On the other hand, in the
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TABLE III
Pooling Routes Types vs. Pooling Carrier Types: Cross-sectional
Estimates
(Dependent Variable: Gloddij )
Pooling All
Pooling Route Types Pooling Carrier Types
(1) (2) majors (3) LCCs (4) non-mixed (5) mixed
− ln ĤERF 0.057*** 0.072*** -0.063*** 0.261*** -0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020)
ln ̂MKTSHARE 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 0.055*** 0.064***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
ln ̂FLTTOT -0.038*** -0.090*** 0.024*** -0.063*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
lnTOURIST -0.098*** -0.157*** -0.017*** -0.090*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
HUB 0.177*** 0.203*** 0.008 0.206*** 0.149***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)
SMALL -0.065*** -0.081*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.130***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
ln ̂ASEATCAP 1.023*** 1.009*** 0.719*** 1.435*** 0.117***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.060) (0.032) (0.035)
Observations 80,013 54,093 25,920 54,629 25,384
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and carrier-specific dummies. Route-specific effects are treated
random. Hats over the variables indicate that the variables were instrumented. Standard errors are in parentheses.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
fourth and fifth columns of Table III, carriers are assumed to be broadly homogeneous
if they compete in the same route. Here, I also assume that majors in the major-carrier
routes are not different from LCCs in the LCC routes in that they are competing with
the same type of carriers.
GS’s results are obtained under the assumption that there are no significant
differences in route and carrier types. However, as shown earlier, the results of Table
II do not seem to support the negative effect of competition on price dispersion in all
routes. Chow tests between (2) and (3) and between (4) and (5) are performed to test
the poolability across groups. The null hypothesis of identical coefficients between
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two groups was rejected in all cases.34 The test results suggest that it may not be
able to pool route types or carrier types.35
Table IV contains the fixed-effects panel estimates obtained from single estima-
tions corresponding to the regressions in Table III. Comparing with the results of the
pooled cross-sectional estimations, the omitted variable biases seem to exist in all
regressions, and the biases flipping the sign of the estimate on route competition are
evident in the second columns of Table IV which aggregate observations of majors
regardless of whether they compete with LCCs or not. Like the results from pooling
all observations, the cross-sectional estimate on − ln ĤERF in the second column of
Table III is 0.072, significant at 1 percent level, but the corresponding fixed-effects
panel estimate is -0.070, significant at 1 percent level. If majors price discriminate dif-
ferently when they compete against one another from when they don’t, the negative
estimate − ln ĤERF in the second column of Table IV would be also inconsistent.
Meanwhile, the estimates in the third and fourth columns of Table IV have
the same sign in both cross-sectional and panel estimations. These results could be
interpreted as follow: competition has a negative effect on LCCs’ price dispersion
regardless of route types; competition has a positive effect on price dispersion if
carriers in a route are relatively homogeneous. I do not want to interpret these
results too much, but they carry some information how the market classification is
important to identify different forces of competition on price dispersion.
34I tested three different null hypotheses: the first one is that the coefficient of
− ln ĤERF are identical between two groups; the second one is that the coefficient
of − ln ĤERF , ln ̂MKTSHARE and ln ̂FLTTOT are identical; the third one is that
all coefficients are identical.
35In order to perform the Chow tests, the estimates must be consistent, but at least
one of the estimates are not consistent since there must be omitted variable biases.
The results from the Chow tests should be limitedly interpreted.
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TABLE IV
Pooling Routes Types vs. Pooling Carrier Types: Fixed-effects Panel
Estimates
(Dependent Variable: Gloddijt )
Pooling All
Pooling of Route Types Pooling of Carrier Types
(1) (2) major (3) low-cost (4) non-mixed (5) mixed
− ln ĤERF -0.104*** -0.070*** -0.224*** 0.135** -0.142***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.041) (0.058) (0.027)
Observations 87,807 60,430 27,377 27,792 60,015
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies, quarter dummies, and a dummy variable for bankruptcy. The
carrier-route-specific effects are treated as fixed. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
2.3. Effects of Route Competition
Table V contains the fixed-effects panel estimates for route competition which are
obtained from using observations of (1) majors of the major-carrier routes, (2) ma-
jors in the mixed-carrier routes, (3) LCCs in the mixed-carrier routes, and (4) LCCs
in the LCC routes. These regressions are performed without any restriction on the
coefficients across route and carrier types, and then identify the relationships of com-
petition and price dispersion in each group.
The Hausman tests between random-effects and fixed-effects estimations are per-
formed, which are the over-identification test on the validity of instrumental variables.
The null hypothesis of zero correlation between carrier-route-specific effects and in-
strument variables were all rejected. Thus, even in the major-carrier routes, there
are omitted variables which are biasing the estimates for route competition. But, as
shown earlier and in Table V, the estimated effect of competition on price dispersion
is positive but insignificant in the major-carrier routes.36 It suggests that the omitted
36The insignificance of the estimate could be due to using the log-odds ratio of the
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TABLE V
Fixed-effects Panel Estimates for Competition from the Gini coefficient
Regressions
(Dependent Variable: Gloddijt )
Majors LCCs
(1) major routes (2) mixed routes (3) mixed routes (4) LCC routes
− ln ĤERF 0.097 -0.107*** -0.223*** -0.102
(0.062) (0.030) (0.042) (0.149)
Observations 20,645 39,590 20,425 6,931
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies, quarter dummies, and a dummy variable for bankruptcy. The
carrier-route-specific effects are treated as fixed. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
variable biases in the major-carrier routes are not large enough to reverse the positive
cross-sectional estimate on competition.
On the other hand, in the mixed-carrier routes, the estimated effects of com-
petition on price dispersion are significantly negative at 5 percent level or less for
both majors and LCCs. The magnitude for majors is −0.107, less than that for
LCCs, −0.223. Comparing the estimate in the second column of Table IV with the
estimates in the first and second columns of Table V, the pooling of route types for
majors results in a negative estimate on route competition whereas the separating of
route types for majors reveals that majors price discriminate differently when they
compete with LCCs from when they don’t.
The results from the price percentile regressions in Table VI show how majors
price discriminate differently when they compete with LCCs and how LCCs price
discriminate differently from majors. The results in the first row of Table VI indicate
that majors seem to perform competitive-type discrimination when they compete
Gini coefficient weighting more on the middle part of the price distribution.
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TABLE VI
Fixed-effects Panel Estimates for Competition from the Price Percentile
Regressions
(Dependent Variable: lnP (k)ijt)
lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) majors in major-carrier routes
− ln ĤERF -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.042 -0.018
(0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.064)
(2) majors in mixed-carrier routes
− ln ĤERF -0.238*** -0.266*** -0.388*** -0.397***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.030) (0.032)
(3) LCCs in mixed-carrier routes
− ln ĤERF -0.078*** -0.132*** -0.299*** -0.293***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026)
(4) LCCs in LCC routes
− ln ĤERF -0.058 -0.134 -0.256*** -0.237***
(0.099) (0.091) (0.083) (0.070)
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies, quarter dummies, and a dummy variable for bankruptcy. The
carrier-route-specific effects are treated as fixed. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
with one another. The estimated effects of competition on the 10th and 20th price
percentiles is -0.122 and -0.117, respectively, and both are significant at 1 percent
level. The negative effect on the 10th price percentile is much larger than that on the
20th percentile. Meanwhile, the estimates on the 80th and 90th price percentiles are
much less than on the 10th and 20th price percentiles and they are both insignificant.
These results are exactly identical to the equilibrium prediction by Borenstein (1985)
and Holmes (1989). Since majors rely on consumers’ cross-price elasticities or brand
loyalties in discriminatory pricing when they compete against one another, competi-
tion reduces the lower portion of the prices much more than the upper portion.
Meanwhile, LCCs seem to price discriminate based on consumers’ different reser-
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vation prices. Thus, competition tends to reduce higher-end prices much more than
lower-end prices since higher-end prices are more profitable. The estimates on− ln ĤERF
for the 80th and 90th price percentiles in the fourth row of Table VI are -0.256 and
-0.237, respectively, and both are significant at 1 percent level while the estimates for
the 10th and 20th percentiles are less than for the 80th and 90th price percentiles
and both are insignificant.
The results from the first and fourth rows of Table VI suggest that majors com-
pete on more cross-price elastic consumers but LCCs compete on more profitable
consumers. Thus, when the two different types of carriers compete in a route, the
different forces of competition on price dispersion could be both evident. It seems
that the effect of LCCs would be much larger than that of majors. I do not report the
results from the price percentile regressions of using the number of majors and LCCs
for brevity. It turns out that the effects of the number of majors are all insignificant
on the price percentiles whereas those of the number of LCCs are negative and signif-
icant. The results suggest that the negative effect of competition on price dispersion
in the mixed-carrier routes are mostly from entries by LCCs. As a result, the overall
effect of competition on price dispersion is much larger on the upper portion of the
price distribution than on the lower portion in the mixed-carrier routes.
The results in (2) and (3) of Table VI show that competition in the mixed-carrier
routes has a much larger effect on the upper portion of the price distribution than
on the lower portion. The estimates on − ln ĤERF from the 80th and 90th price
percentile regressions are -0.388 and -0.397 for majors, respectively, significant at 1
percent level, which are much larger in absolute value than the estimates from the
10th and 20th price percentile regressions for majors, -0.238 and -0.266. The results
for LCCs are similar like those for majors. In addition, the estimated effects of route
competition in the mixed-carrier routes on each price percentile for majors are much
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larger than those for LCCs.
Overall, the effect of competition on price dispersion depends on whether or not
majors compete with LCCs. If majors compete against one another, competition has
a positive effect on price dispersion since majors perform competitive-type discrimina-
tion. If they compete with LCCs, competition has a negative effect on price dispersion
since LCCs compete on more profitable consumers so that majors are forced to re-
duce higher-end prices much larger than lower-end prices. The positive relationship
between competition and price dispersion found by BR is still evident in the major-
carrier routes whereas the negative relationship by GS exists in the mixed-carrier
routes.
2.4. Effects of Other Variables
Since the fixed-effects panel estimations do not provide the effects of other variables, I
rely on the results of the pooled and rolling cross-sectional estimations in interpreting
the effects of the other variables on price dispersion in each type of routes with respect
to carrier types. All Chow tests reject the null hypothesis of identical coefficients
between (1) and (2) and between (3) and (4), which suggests that majors are different
in discriminatory pricing when they compete with the same type of carriers or the
other different type of carriers.
Table VII contains the results from the pooled cross-sectional estimation dur-
ing the period of 1993.Q1 ∼ 2006.Q3.37 If the instrument variables are invalid ac-
cording to the results of the Hausman tests in the panel analysis, the estimated
effects of the instrumented variables, − ln ĤERF , ln ̂MKTSHARE, ln ̂FLTTOT ,
and ln ̂ASEATCAP could be asymptotically biased, and so the interpretations for
37Appendix B depicts the results obtained from the quarterly and rolling
estimations.
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TABLE VII
Pooled Cross-Sectional Estimates for Other Variables
( Dependent Variable: Gloddij )
Majors LCCs
(1) major routes (2) mixed routes (3) mixed routes (4) LCC routes
− ln ĤERF 0.307*** 0.071*** -0.130*** 0.065**
(0.013) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029)
ln ̂MKTSHARE 0.023*** 0.086*** -0.028 0.120***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014)
ln ̂FLTTOT -0.118*** 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
lnTOURIST -0.179*** -0.041*** -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
HUB 0.239*** 0.161*** 0.114*** -0.076***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023)
SMALL -0.037*** -0.194*** -0.064*** -0.031***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010)
ln ̂ASEATCAP 1.407*** 0.186*** -0.961*** 1.338***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.135) (0.106)
Observations 39,502 14,149 11,235 14,390
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and carrier-specific dummies. Route-specific effects are treated
random. Hats over the variables indicate that the variables were instrumented. Standard errors are in parentheses.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
these estimates must be restricted indeed.
One thing distinguished from GS is that a carrier’s relative market position gener-
ally has a positive and significant effect on price dispersion. GS implicitly interpreted
that a negative estimate for market share with including plane size could be supported
by the findings of Evans and Kessides (1993) saying that airfare is not correlated with
market share.38 The relative market position of majors in the mixed-carrier routes
seems to price discriminate more strongly than in the major-carrier routes. The es-
38Some of the estimates on market share from the quarterly and rolling cross-
sectional estimations for majors in the mixed-carrier routes are negative as seen in
Appendix B.
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timate for market share in the second column of Table VII is 0.086, significant at
1 percent level, larger than 0.023 in the first column. If the higher market share in
the mixed-carrier routes indicates consumers’ stronger preference on majors’ brand,
a major airline may exploit its high market share to price discriminate to a greater
extent. So, it seems that a major airline would be less affected by LCCs if its market
share is relatively large with holding other variables as constant.
On the other hand, if a LCC has a larger market share in a mixed-carrier route,
majors in the route may respond by reducing prices since the LCC attracts customers
by offering lower prices than majors. So, the larger market share of the LCC in the
route could be obtained by offering much lower prices than the other carriers in the
route. The estimate for LCCs’ market share in the mixed-carrier routes is -0.028,
insignificant. However, when LCCs compete with one another, they also seem to
exploit the relative market position in discriminatory pricing. The estimate for LCCs’
market share in the LCC routes is 0.120, significant at 1 percent level.
The estimated effects of route density measured by FLTTOT are mixed across
the estimations. The estimate on ln ̂FLTTOT is -0.118 for majors in the major-
carrier routes while it is 0.037 for majors in the mixed-carrier routes. The negative
effect of route density in the major-carrier routes is consistent with the finding of BR.
In contrast, it is not obvious to interpret the positive effect of route density in (2)
through (4) of Table VII. It could be interpreted that any carriers price discriminate to
a larger extent since they compete on more profitable consumers so that the increased
number of flights may increase market power to discriminate.
The results for the other variables suggest that majors are price discriminating
to a greater extent when they compete with one another rather than when they
compete with LCCs. These findings are somewhat consistent with the finding that
competition has a positive effect on price dispersion in the major-carrier routes. If
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majors perform competitive-type discrimination in the major-carrier routes, it implies
that competition does not affect much on the upper portion of the prices. That is, a
major airline does not lose much its discriminatory power to charge higher prices to
less cross-price elastic consumers. However, if majors are forced to reduce the upper
portion much greater than the lower portion due to competition by LCCs, they lose
their own discriminatory power much more than majors in the major-carrier routes.
The estimate on lnTOURIST is -0.179 for majors in the major-carrier routes,
which is much greater in absolute value than -0.041 for majors in the mixed-carrier
routes. Both coefficient estimates are significant at 1 percent level. Since travel-
ers are much more sensitive to differences in price across airlines in a route than
businessmen, majors may lose their discriminatory power as consumer heterogeneity
decreases or as the value of lnTOURIST increases. Thus, the larger magnitude of
the estimate implies that majors use information on consumer heterogeneity in price
discrimination.
Also, the estimate for hub dominance in the major-carrier routes is 0.239 while
it is 0.161 in the mixed-carrier route. Both are significant at 1 percent level. That is,
if a major airline has a hub dominance in a route, it price discriminates to a larger
extent when it competes with other majors than when it compete with LCCs. The
effect of route congestion by the dummy SMALL is -0.037 for majors in the major-
carrier routes, much less in absolute value than -0.194 for majors in the mixed-carrier
routes. Thus, majors use route congestion in systematic peak-loading pricing when
they compete against one another much more than when they compete with LCCs.
In addition, the estimate for plane size is 1.407 for majors in the major-carrier routes
while it is 0.186 for majors in the mixed-carrier routes. Both are also significant at 1
percent level. It implies that a major airline with a larger plane in a given route price
discriminate to a greater extent in the major-carrier routes than in the mixed-carrier
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routes.
The estimation results for LCCs are somewhat mixed in that LCCs seem to also
price discriminate to a greater degree when they compete with one another whereas
some of the results do not support it. For instance, the estimated effect of hub
dominance is 0.114 for LCCs in the mixed-carrier routes while it is -0.076 for LCCs
in the LCC routes. Meanwhile, the estimated effect of plane size is -0.961 for LCCs
in the mixed-carrier routes while it is 1.338 for LCCs in the LCC routes.
D. Summary
As a way of reconciling the opposite results of the literature, the paper examines
whether major airlines price discriminate differently when they compete with LCCs
from when they don’t. It turns out that all cross-sectional estimates on route compe-
tition suffer from the omitted variables biases as Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) found.
However, the possible omitted variable bias are not large enough to flip the sign of the
estimator on route competition for major airlines in the major-carrier routes which
are similar to the routes selected by Borenstein and Rose (1994).
The primary finding of the paper is that the opposite results are both evident in
the airline domestic industry. Price dispersion can increase or decrease with competi-
tion. It depends on the different forces of competition which is not ever investigated
in the literature. In the major-carrier routes, competition has a positive effect on
price dispersion as estimated by Borenstein and Rose (1994). On the other hand,
in the mixed-carrier routes, competition has a negative effect on price dispersion as
found by Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) interpret their
results as being evident in all routes. However, the negative relationship between
route competition and price dispersion should be limited to the mixed-carrier routes
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where major airlines compete with LCCs.
The overall findings suggest that major airlines compete on more cross-price
elastic or less brand-loyal consumers when they compete with one another whereas
LCCs compete on more profitable consumers with higher reservation prices. Thus,
when both types of carriers compete together in the mixed-carrier routes, major
airlines are forced to reduce higher-end prices much more than lower-end prices since
LCCs offer much lower fares even to less cross-price elastic consumers than them.
Moreover, the results for the other variables also suggest that major airlines are price
discriminating to a greater extent when they compete with one another rather than
when they compete with LCCs.
Finally, there are possible preemptive responses to the threat of entry by LCCs
which is not considered in the paper. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) find that major
airlines significantly cut fares when threatened by Southwest Airlines before actual
entries. Therefore, it is certainly possible that there would exist threat effects on price
dispersion. Moreover, these empirical findings demand a theoretical explanation of
why major airlines price discriminate differently when they compete with LCCs. In
the context of Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), there must be changes in the
cross-price elasticities of demand when any LCCs enter into a market. It could be
seen as the effect of consumers’ benefits obtained from switching to LCCs which has
been not yet incorporated in theories of price discrimination.
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CHAPTER III
WHEN DO INCUMBENTS REDUCE PRICE DISPERSION
PREEMPTIVELY? NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE MAJOR AIRLINES
A. Introduction
Whether incumbents respond preemptively to potential competitors is a classic de-
bate in the pricing theory of economics, and empirical studies in the airline industry
had not supported that incumbents cut prices before actual entry, prior to Goolsbee
and Syverson (2008). The airline industry has been a free-entry (exit) market since
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Many studies investigate whether a potential
competitor servicing both endpoints of a route can motivate incumbents to cut prices
before actual entry, by using cross-sectional data. Borenstein (1992) reviews that
cross-sectional studies find no substitute effect of potential competition for actual
competition. In contrast, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) suggest new evidence for in-
cumbents’ preemptive responses to the threat of entry, by using panel data. They find
that incumbents cut the average price significantly when threatened by Southwest.
The paper examines the effects of entry threat on price dispersion rather than
on the average price since the airline industry has been price discriminating after
the deregulation. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) identify incumbents’ preemptive
responses on the average price, but do not explain how incumbents adjust incumbents’
discriminatory pricing. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Lee (2010) investigate the
relationship between actual competition and price dispersion by using panel data, but
both studies do not examine the effects of the inclusion of potential competition.
The paper is further focused on identifying incumbents’ motives of preemptive
responses if they respond to the threat of entry, by comparing the estimated effects
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of entry threat on price dispersion between the routes which Southwest entered later
and the routes which Southwest didn’t. If incumbents’ price cuts are motivated by
uncertainty about a rival’s entry, the rival also has motives to inform its entry earlier
and discourage incumbents from pursuing entry deterrence. Therefore, incumbents’
preemptive responses may depend on whether they are informed about the potential
rival’s entry.
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) attempt to find the motives of preemptive re-
sponses, but their results from pooling all threatened routes do not clearly identify
whether incumbents are responding in order to deter or accommodate entry. If in-
cumbents don’t know about the rival’s future entry, they may choose to deter or
accommodate entry depending on which strategy is more profitable to incumbents.
In this case, it is difficult to identify the motives of preemptive responses since the
equilibrium strategic response in each route depends on the belief about the rival’s
future entry which are different across the threatened routes. Therefore, the price
cuts in the threatened routes could be seen as for both deterring or accommodating
entry.
Their suggestive evidence for entry deterrence is obtained from the immediately-
serviced (pre-announced) routes. Southwest announces its beginning service before
it immediately enters a route upon establishing presence in both endpoints of the
route. So, incumbents have no motives to deter Southwest’s entry so that they do
not cut fares significantly before actual entry in these routes. However, even in
the routes threatened by Southwest, incumbents can be privately informed about the
timing of Southwest’s entry which is revealed in the process of advertising, negotiating
gate leases, and so on.1 That is, if incumbents’ preemptive responses are affected
1Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) also addresses that incumbents may find out im-
pending entries before the public announcement.
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by Southwest’s entry signaling, incumbents do neither cut prices nor reduce price
dispersion when they are almost certain about the rival’s entry like in the immediately-
serviced routes.
Not surprisingly, incumbents reduce price dispersion in the routes which are still
threatened by Southwest whereas they do not significantly reduce price dispersion
in the routes which are once-threatened and serviced by Southwest. The results
are obtained from separating the threatened routes depending on whether Southwest
entered later and from excluding the routes that were never significantly serviced by
any LCCs. If the still-threatened routes were never really attractive to Southwest,
the preemptive reduction in price dispersion could not be interpreted as incumbents’
deterring Southwest’s entry. In other words, if other LCCs significantly serviced a
route, the route could be also attractive to Southwest. Thus, these results suggest
that incumbents successfully deter Southwest’s entry by reducing price dispersion
preemptively.
Because of limitations of information on whether Southwest announced before
actual entry among the threatened routes, the effects of pre-announcements are not
directly controlled for. Like the finding of Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), the results
from the immediately-serviced (pre-announced) routes support that incumbents do
not significantly reduce price dispersion when pre-announced by Southwest. Even
when the rival’s entry is pre-announced, incumbents still have incentives to accom-
modate Southwest’s entry by locking in valuable customers. So, they may engage in
generating switching cost like offering double or triple miles or upgrading customer
services, which leads to increased prices.
The estimated effects of actual competition on price dispersion are generally
consistent with the findings of Lee (2010) that the negative effect of actual competition
is from the competitive effects of LCCs where the positive effect is from those of
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majors. In contrast, when incumbents reduce price dispersion for entry deterrence,
the number of major airlines has a negative effect on price dispersion during the threat
period. Unlike the previous studies, I include the effects of Southwest’s exit on price
dispersion. When Southwest exits a route, high-end prices are quickly adjusted up
to the level before threatened by Southwest, whereas lower-end prices are still lower
than the level before threatened by Southwest.
The paper restricts the analysis to the 8 major airlines. They are all network
full-service airlines and have relatively higher cost structures than Southwest. Lee
(2010) finds that major airlines price discriminate differently when they compete with
LCCs comparing to when they don’t. Therefore, major airlines could be affected by
other incumbent LCCs’ responses to Southwest’s threat of entry. For this reason,
the paper primarily analyzes the routes where major airlines compete against one
another before threatened by Southwest and then compete with any LCCs. However,
the results from analyzing the routes where major airlines compete with other LCCs
even before threatened by Southwest are generally consistent with the results from
the former type of routes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Subsection B presents the
data along with the way of identifying Southwest’s threat, entry, and exit, and dis-
cusses incumbents’ hypothetical motives of preemptive responses and suggestes em-
pirical strategy to identify the motives of reducing price dispersion preemptively.
Subsection C includes the fixed-effects panel specifications and reports the empirical
findings. Finally, Subsection D concludes.
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B. Data and Identifying Motives of Preemptive Responses
1. Data
The empirical analysis focuses on the U.S. airline routes once threatened by Southwest
airlines. Southwest, one of low-cost carriers, is well-known for the most profitable U.S.
airline. It has brought significant falls in ticket fares and increases in passengers since
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.2 The data are built upon Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009) and Lee (2010). They are originally collected from the DB1B and the T-100
domestic direct segments. The DB1B data are a 10 percent random sample of all
domestic tickets, and the T-100 data contain ticket information on domestic nonstop
flights. It covers domestic, direct, directional, and coach-class airline tickets over the
period of 1993:Q1 - 2006:Q3.
A route is defined by its two endpoint airports. The core sample includes routes
between 65 airports at which Southwest ever serviced non-stop flights. Figure 6 de-
picts the number of airports serviced by Southwest from 1993:Q1 to 2006:Q3. South-
west serviced at 36 airports prior to the first quarter of 1993, and serviced at 62
airports in the third quarter of 2006.3
Southwest’s threat to a route is identified by airport presence in both two end-
points of the route. Airport presence could be regarded as a predictor of future
2Until 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) awarded routes to airlines, limited
the entry of new carriers, and regulated fares for passengers. After the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act of 1978, airlines had full freedoms to enter the routes and (from 1982) to
set their fares. In 1984, the CAB was finally abolished as their major controls were
no longer necessary.
3Southwest exited three airports during the sample period: Detroit City(DET) in
1993:Q4, San Francisco(SFO) in 2001:Q2, and Bush International(IAH) in 2005:Q2.
Though it stopped its service in these three airports, it continued to provide its direct
flights in a neighboring airport of each multiple-airports area.
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Fig. 6.—Number of Airports Serviced by Southwest
entry.4 For example, Southwest began its service at Philadelphia on May 9, 2004.
It started its non-stop flights in 7 routes from 2004:Q2, and threatened incumbents
in 19 additional routes.5 Among the 19 routes, 12 routes were eventually operated
by Southwest in at most three years later.6 Moreover, it exited routes from Louis
Armstrong New Orleans to Philadelphia (2004:Q3 - 2005:Q3), Philadelphia to San
Diego (2004:Q3 - 2005:Q1), and Salt Lake City to Philadelphia (2005:Q1).
4Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) provides a good review including Bailey (1981),
Berry (1992), and Peteraf and Reed (1994). Bogulaski, Ito, and Lee (2004) use
some variables controlling for Southwest’s pre-entry presence at the endpoints of each
market in estimating Southwest’s entry decision.
5Six non-stop destinations were immediately serviced by Southwest on May 9,
2004: Chicago Midway, Las Vegas, Orlando, Phoenix, Providence, and Tampa Bay.
Later within 2004:Q2, it also provided services to Los Angeles.
6Six routes (Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Manchester, Los Angeles, Louis Arm-
strong New Orleans, Palm Beach, and Raleigh-Durham) are serviced in one quarter
later, two routes (Bradley and Jacksonville) in two quarters later, one route (Salt
Lake) in three quarters later, one route (Kansas) in two years later, and two routes
(Port Columbus and Nashville) in two and half years later.
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Figure 7 shows the overall dynamics of Southwest’s threat, entry, and exit during
the sample period. The number in Figure 7 represents the number of unique routes
at the third quarter of each year. It is obvious that the number of routes serviced by
Southwest has been increasing over time while the number of the threatened routes has
been decreasing. First of all, I identify routes which Southwest ever serviced during
the sample period. It gives information on the 65 airports serviced by Southwest.
Then, the first quarter when Southwest reported its ticket information from or to a
given airport is the first time when Southwest began direct services in the airport.
By comparing between the time when it established presence in both endpoints of
the route and the time when Southwest began service in the given route, the periods
threatened by Southwest are identified. The time when Southwest exits a given route
is also identified in the same way. As a result, three types of routes are identified as
follow: still-threatened (not-yet-serviced), threatened-and-serviced, and immediately-
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serviced. The first two types of routes were once threatened by Southwest, but the
latter ones were eventually serviced by Southwest. The third type of routes are the
routes where Southwest began service upon establishing presence in both endpoints.
The analysis is restricted to the 8 major airlines during the period: American,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, USAir, TWA, and Alaska. Their responses
can depend on whether they are already competing with other LCCs. Lee (2010) find
that majors price discriminate differently when they compete with LCCs from when
they don’t. An entry of any LCCs reduces the upper portion of the price distribution
much more than the lower portion. Thus, though the effects of entry threat would be
identical in the direction, the magnitude could be different depending on the presence
of other LCCs before threatened by Southwest.
As in Lee (2010), a route is named as a major-carrier route if the quarterly
market share of LCCs is less than 5 percent. If not, the route is classified into a mixed-
carrier route. Among 442 threatened routes, there are 224 routes where major airlines
significantly compete with other LCCs before Southwest’s presence in both endpoints,
whereas there are 198 routes where major airlines do not significantly compete with
other LCCs before Southwest’s presence. Therefore, the paper separately analyzes the
effects of entry threat depending on whether incumbents compete with other LCCs
before Southwest’s presence in both endpoints.7
When analyzing the threatened routes, I exclude the routes which were never
significantly serviced by any LCCs since there are possibly route-specific factors to
impede any LCCs from entering a route regardless of incumbents’ preemptive re-
sponses.8 Of course, the routes which began services prior to the first quarter of
7Daraban and Fournier (2009) include other LCCs’ events of entry and exit, in-
dependently, but do not take account for interactive effects of other LCCs on incum-
bents’ preemptive responses.
8The 88 routes with 4,938 carrier-route-quarter observations are the routes threat-
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the sample (1993:Q1) are excluded.9 Also, if the time-series observations in a route
are not less than 20 consecutive quarters or the consecutive periods are at most 20
quarters, the route is excluded.
In all, the final core sample includes 545 routes with 30,270 carrier-route-quarter
observations10: 217 still-threatened routes with 12,413 observations, 205 threatened-
serviced routes with 11,431 observations, and 123 immediately-serviced routes with
6,426 observations.
2. Identifying Motives of Preemptive Responses
Firms in an oligopoly market may respond preemptively to the threat of entry when
they are uncertain about a rival’s future entry or even when they know about it.
Since the airline industry is price discriminating over consumers, it is possible that
incumbents adjust their discriminatory pricing responding to the threat of entry for
either of entry deterrence or accommodation. Lee (2010) shows that when a LCC like
Southwest enters a market, major airlines reduce price dispersion. So, firms in this
oligopoly market, may respond preemptively to the threat of entry by reducing price
dispersion.11
ened by Southwest but never significantly serviced by any LCCs. In some sense, these
routes could be also regarded as routes that incumbents had strongly deterred LCCs’
entry. The preliminary estimates on entry threat do not support the idea of strongly-
deterred routes.
9This criterion drops 38 routes with 2,179 carrier-route-quarter observations.
10Both directions of routes are kept. The standard errors are clustered by routes to
control for serial correlation and correlation between incumbents on the same route
like Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). If one direction of
a given route is dropped, the number of routes is not enough to cluster the standards
errors. None of the previous researches using the DB1B data indicates whether it use
only one direction: Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Daraban and Fournier (2009), and
Prince and Simon (2010).
11See Goolsbee and Syverson (2008): incumbents significantly reduce fares when
threatened by Southwest but do not significantly increase either capacity or available
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2.1. Hypothetical Motives: Deterrence or Accommodation?
The preemptive responses are for the purpose of either deterring or accommodating
the rival’s actual entry.12 Incumbents may attempt to deter the potential rival’s
entry when erecting a barrier to entry is more profitable than letting the rival enter
the market. If entry deterrence is too costly, incumbents may choose to accommodate
the rival’s entry. The difference between the two strategic responses is whether to
allow the rival’s entry.
Berry (1992) suggests that the entry decision of airlines indicates underlying prof-
itability of a route after the entry. If a market is price discriminating like the airline
industry, a potential rival would not enter the market if incumbents preemptively
reduce higher-end prices much more than lower-end prices. The rival may expect
some profits from incumbents’ discriminatory pricing, but it will expect lower prof-
itability if incumbents give up some profits from higher-end prices by cutting them
preemptively. That is, the profitability of a market may depend on the degree of price
dispersion so that the rival’s entry decision may be affected by incumbents’ preemp-
tive reduction in price dispersion. So, a reduction in price dispersion may indicate
incumbents’ motives to deter the rival’s entry.13
Meanwhile, incumbents may also reduce price dispersion preemptively to lock
passengers.
12Bain (1956) suggests three kinds of responses by incumbents to the threat of
entry: (1) blockaded entry, (2) deterred entry, and (3) accommodated entry. Entry is
blockaded if structural barriers are so high that the incumbents need to do nothing
to deter entry.
13Strassmann (1990) finds that future entry is influenced by current prices. This
argument is quite related to the contestability of the airline industry: if a market is
contestable, then potential competitors would not enter the market. Most empirical
cross-sectional studies do not support the contestability of the airline industry. See
Borenstein (1992) for more details. However, regarding the fixed-effects panel results
in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), the prior cross-sectional results could indeed suffer
from omitted unobservable time-invariant factors.
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in more valuable customers before the rival’s actual entry, particularly in a case
that the rival has advantage of lower marginal cost than incumbents. For instance,
Southwest is well-known for being a low-cost carrier while major airlines are burdened
by relatively high operating costs. Thus, incumbents may attempt to increase demand
for today’s flights by cutting prices for customers paying higher-end prices and so
stimulating old customers as well as generating new customers, resulting that the old
customers are less likely to switch later to the low-cost rival due to lowered prices.
Also, increases in demand due to lower prices generate switching cost to the customers
so that the more customers are less likely to switch to the rival later. So, a reduction
in price dispersion may be a result from incumbents’ entry accommodation.
If incumbents reduce price dispersion for accommodation as well as for deter-
rence, it is very difficult to identify the motives of incumbents’ preemptive responses
by looking at the effects on price dispersion. Moreover, though incumbents intend
to deter entry by reducing price dispersion, they might be unsuccessful in deterring
entry so that the preemptive reduction in price dispersion could not tell what was the
purpose of reducing price dispersion. Then, it would be concluded that incumbents
reduce price dispersion responding to the threat of entry but the reason for reducing
price dispersion is not clearly identified.
Incumbents may deter or accommodate entry preemptively to the threat of entry
since they are uncertain about the rival’s future entry. depending on which strategy is
more profitable on the belief of the likelihood of the rival’s entry. That is, incumbents’
motive of preemptive responses is determined by the equilibrium payoffs of each choice
and the belief on the rival’s entry.
However, in some sense, if incumbents are informed about the rival’s future entry,
they might try to accommodate actual entry rather than to deter entry. Specially,
if consumers incur cost of switching from incumbents to the rival, incumbents may
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prefer generating switching cost to reducing price dispersion. Or, they may engage
in both strategies of reducing price dispersion and generating switching cost. The
resulted price dispersion may depend on how much incumbents concentrate on one of
both strategies. If incumbents can respond in prices as quickly as the potential rival
can enter, the incumbents may not reduce price dispersion in advance of actual entry,
but rather engage in generating switching cost.14 So, when incumbents are informed
about the rival’s entry, incumbents may not reduce price disperion preemptively for
entry accommodation.
The rival also has motives to announce its future entry if they know that incum-
bents reduce price dispersion for the purpose of entry deterrence. Then, incumbents
may not significantly reduce price dispersion, but rather accommodate entry. Gerlach
(2004) shows that announcements have a positive demand pull effect on consumers
with switching costs if incumbents do not intend to deter pre-announced entry. The
timing of announcing entry would also matter with incumbents’ preemptive responses.
Ellison and Ellison (2004) find that the entry-deterring behavior is not observed in
blockbuster drugs whose U.S. patent protection is scheduled to expire.15 Since in-
cumbents certainly expect that generic drugs enter for replacing blockbuster drugs,
they have no motives to deter generic entry. In contrast, the entry-deterring behavior
occurs for more drugs with relatively low revenues which are less certain about the
timing of generic entry. Thus, if incumbents have no motives to deter entry or if their
deterrence is not effective, incumbents may not reduce price dispersion significantly.16
14See Stiglitz (1987): potential competition could be ineffective on price competi-
tion while it may affect incumbents’ decision on increasing sunk costs, in his paper,
R&D expenditures. In line with the airline industry, generating switching cost could
be seen as a sunk cost to incumbents.
15Their data include 63 distinct chemical compounds that faced potential generic
entry as the result of a patent expiration between 1986 and 1992.
16It is analogous to separating equilibria driven by signaling in an extensive game
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2.2. Empirical Strategy: Comparing Still-threatened vs. Serviced Markets
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) attempted to identify what is the motive of the pre-
emptive price cuts, and they suggest that incumbents cut prices in a hope to deter
Southwest’s entry. If price cuts were for entry accommodation rather than deter-
rence, then price cuts should be observed on routes where deterrence isn’t possible.
In the immediately-serviced (pre-announced) routes as no-deterrence-motive routes,
they find that preemptive price cuts are not significant. So, incumbents may not
reduce price dispersion even when seemingly threatened by Southwest if they are in-
formed about Southwest’s entry. If incumbents cut prices for the purpose of entry
deterrence, Southwest may prefer announcing its beginning service prior to actual
entry, to discourage incumbents from reducing price dispersion.
As depicted in Figure 8, Southwest has never serviced the Philadelphia-Cleveland
route since the second quarter of 2004. In contrast, the Philadelphia-Nashville route
was threatened by Southwest upon the fourth quarter of 2004 when it established
presence in both endpoints. It took 8 quarters for Southwest to take off non-stop
flights. By using this criterion, there are the two types of routes threatened by
Southwest. The first type is routes which are still threatened and not serviced yet by
Southwest. The second type is routes which were once-threatened and is serviced by
Southwest.
The threatened-serviced routes would be the routes where incumbents were pri-
vately informed before Southwest entry. In some sense, incumbents may know about
the timing of Southwest’s entry even before Southwest announces its detailed sched-
ules. Then, their preemptive responses could be affected by the information about
Southwest’s service beginning even before the announcement. During the processes
with asymmetric information.
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(2004:Q2)
still threatened
Cleveland
(1992:Q1)
threatened from
2004:Q2; serviced
from 2006:Q3
Nashville
(1986:Q1)
Fig. 8.—Differences between PHL-CLE and PHL-BNA: The date in parenthesis
indicates the first quarter of Southwest’s service in each airport. Cleveland airport is
one of the airports serviced by Southwest prior to the first quarter of 1993. The start-up
date in Cleveland is February 13, 1992.
of establishing a new service for a route, the information on the new flight may reveal
to incumbents prior to the announcement date or beginning date.
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) estimate the effects of entry threat on the average
price by pooling the threatened routes regardless of whether Southwest entered later.
The underlying assumption is that the effects of entry threat are identical across the
threatened routes and that incumbents are uncertain about Southwest’s future entry.
They recognize that incumbents may know about Southwest’s entry even before the
public announcement, but they do not explain why incumbents cut prices even when
they know about the future entry in the threatened routes. Therefore, pooling all
threatened routes may result in some average estimates for entry threat between the
two possible separating equilibria.
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One of the possible equilibria is that the rival announces its entry and incumbents
accommodate entry. The other equilibrium is that the rival does not announce its
entry and incumbents deter entry. The former type of equilibrium would be observed
in the threatened-serviced routes while the latter in the still-threatened routes. That
is, among the threatened routes, the effects of entry threat on price dispersion can
be different depending on whether Southwest announced before actual entry. So, the
comparison of incumbents’ preemptive responses on price dispersion between the two
types of the threatened routes may help to understand the motives of preemptive
responses.17
Unfortunately, the DB1B and T-100 data do not include information about en-
try announcement for the threatened routes, and other available local and business
press releases would contain full information of entry announcement for all threatened
routes. Instead of identifying all information of pre-announcements, I take a easier
course to deal with this problem since most of selected routes among the threatened-
serviced routes are pre-announced before its actual entry.18 I treat the threatened-
serviced routes as pre-announced routes among the threatened routes. For instance,
when it began its Philadelphia service from May 9, 2004, it announced that addi-
tional 14 flights will begin July 6, 2004, to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Manchester,
17Let the variable y = (y1, y2) indicate the degree of price dispersion in each type of
routes, x1 = (x11, x21) entry threat, and x2 = x12 actual entry which does not happen
in the second group of a market:
y1 = x11β11 + x12β12 + 1,
y2 = x21β21 + 2,
where E[x′iji] = 0 for i, j = 1, 2 and E[′ij] = 0 if i 6= j and σi if i = j. If β11 = β21,
pooling all routes produces consistent estimates for entry threat and actual entry. In
contrast, if β11 6= β21, pooling all routes results in inconsistent estimates.
18I searched information about pre-announcements via Lexis-Nexis and Southwest
official site.
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Los Angeles, and so on. So, incumbents in these routes may know about the timing
of Southwest’s entry as much as those in 6 routes which are immediately serviced.
In cases that Southwest immediately began service upon establishing presence in
both endpoints of a route, Southwest always announced its arrival in a new airport at
least before 3 months.19 Therefore, it is possible to examine whether incumbents do
not reduce price dispersion in these routes. It is also possible that incumbents in the
threatened routes had engaged in entry deterrence by reducing price dispersion before
Southwest announces and then altered its response to entry accommodation. That is,
incumbents would be unsuccessful in deterring Southwest’s entry, and subsequently
let Southwest entry after they are informed about Southwest entry in some ways. For
instance, in the case of the Nashville-Philadelphia route where Southwest entered in
two and half years later after its presence, it officially announced two months ago that
two new daily nonstop flights will be provided between Philadelphia and Nashville.20
Though it is not known how long before incumbents know about the entry and
there would be unsuccessful entry deterrence, separating the threatened routes de-
pending on whether Southwest entered later and comparing the effects of entry threat
on price dispersion between the still-threatened and threatened-serviced routes help
understand incumbents’ motives of reducing price dispersion prior to actual entry,
more than the prior studies.
19Appendix C contains the information about the initial destinations from the new
airport, the date of beginning service, and the announcement date.
20Usually, the announcement date is not longer than two or three months before
actual entry if the route is already threatened by Southwest.
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C. Empirical Analysis
1. Model Specifications
1.1. Gini Coefficient Regression
The specification is based on Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) since the analysis focuses
on price dispersion instead of average price. Like Goolsbee and Syverson (2008),
dummies for indicating Southwest’s presence, entry, and exist are included in the
panel model:
Gloddijt = β0 + β1N
LEG
jt + β2N
LCC
jt + β3dp ·NLCCjt + β4de ·NLCCjt
+
5+∑
s=−(5+)
γsT
WN
j,tp+s +
5+∑
s=0
θsE
WN
j,te+s +
4∑
s=0
φsX
WN
j,tx+s
+β5Bkrptit + τt + νij + εijt,
where i indicates carrier, j route and t quarter.21
The Gini log-odds ratio Gloddijt is given by lnG/(1−G) where G is the Gini coef-
ficient.22 To isolate the competitive effect of major airlines from that of other LCCs,
the number of major competitors NLEG and the number of other LCCs NLCC in an
airport-pair route are separately used for actual competition.23 Moreover, to control
for the competitive effects of other LCCs during the threat period and the entry
period, I introduce the interaction terms for the competitive effects of other LCCs
during the threat period and the entry period, dp ·NLCC and dp ·NLCC . The dummies
dp and de indicate whether a route is threatened or serviced at time t by Southwest,
21Note that ‘WN’ is the official IATA airline abbreviation for Southwest.
22The Gini coefficient is bounded between zero and one whereas the log-odds ratio
produces an unbounded statistic.
23The number of LCCs is calculated as follows: i) regional airlines are included, ii)
Southwest is excluded in the number of LCCs in the route from the time of entry, as
its presence will be captured by entry dummies.
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respectively. For instance, the competitive effect of NLCC during the threat period
dp is given by β2 + β3. So, the idea is that the effect of an LCC on price dispersion
may differ depending on whether incumbent major airlines are also contending with
the threat of entry from Southwest.
Like Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), a window of 25-quarter period is used for
time dummies of Southwest’s presence in a route, TWNj,tp+s (Southwest’s threat of en-
try), where tp indicates the first quarter when Southwest establishes presence in both
endpoints of a route but does not begin service yet. I include 5 dummies before
Southwest’s establishment in both endpoints. One of them is for the 5th through 8th
quarters prior to tp. So, I exclude the period between the 9th through 12th quar-
ters prior to tp. Also, after tp, I include time dummies in the same way. The last
dummy after tp is for the 5th through 12th quarters after tp. When I look at the
effect of pre-announcement by Southwest in the immediately-serviced routes, I use 5
dummies, AWNj,te−s(Southwest’s pre-announcement), instead of using the dummies for
entry threat.
I add 6 time dummies, EWNj,te+s (Southwest’s actual entry), that explain the effects
of Southwest’s actual entry to a given route. The te indicates the first quarter when
Southwest starts to take off its direct flights. The last dummy for actual entry is for
the 5th and 8th quarters after te. Moreover, following Daraban and Fournier (2008),
I add 5 dummies, XWNj,tx+s (Southwest’s exit), for identifying the effects of Southwest’s
exit. The tx indicates the first quarter that Southwest exits a given route.
24
I use time dummies and quarter dummies, τt, in order to control for exogenous
events on cost variables and cyclical demand effects. Further, in order to control for
carrier-specific events, I use bankruptcy dummy, Bkrptit, which indicates whether
24Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) do not include dummies for route exit in the
estimation.
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the ith airline is in bankruptcy at time t. Finally, carrier-route-specific effects, νij,
are treated as fixed effects in the estimation.
Originally, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) control for both of carrier-route-specific
and carrier-quarter-specific effects as fixed. On the other hand, Huse and Oliveira
(2009) suggest that the usual approach to fixed-effects even like Goolsbee and Syver-
son (2008) may lead to inconsistent estimation of pricing equations since it fails
to account for relevant time-varying effects at the airline and city levels and those
unobservable time-varying effects are correlated with dummies for actual entry and
potential entry.25 It is possible that incumbents may respond to the threat of entry by
enhancing miles or by upgrading customer service, which are mostly unobservable to
econometricians. These unobservable effects could be understood as being triggered
by the threat of entry, and so the estimates on time dummies for threat, entry, and
exit could be also biased if those unobservable time-varying effects are not controlled
for.26
Meanwhile, since I analyze the effects on price dispersion rather than on the
average price, it is not clear whether the biases of not controlling for the unobserv-
able time-varying effects at the airline and city levels are significant. Moreover, the
specification following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) has the advantage of controlling
for financial conditions by using bankruptcy dummy, which could be a reason that
an incumbent with financial difficulty would not respond preemptively to the threat
of entry.
25Huse and Oliveira (2009) treat time dummies before actual entry as potential
entry regardless of whether or not the LCCs establishes presence in both endpoints.
26Huse and Oliveira (2009) interpret their insignificant estimates on potential entry
as empirical evidence that incumbents do not respond preemptively to the potential
entry. However, the estimates could be insignificant since the time dummies do not
actually indicate the threat of entry by LCCs.
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1.2. Price Percentile Regression
The price percentile regression use the price percentiles for the denpendent variable
instead of the Gini log-odds ratio. The results from the price percentile regressions
help explain incumbents’ responses on the tails of the price distribution.
The specification is given by
lnP (k)ijt = β0 + β1N
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LCC
jt + β3dp ·NLCCjt + β4de ·NLCCjt
+
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+β5Bkrptit + τt + νij + εijt,
where k is the 10th, 20th, 80th, or 90th price percentile.
If the 10th and 20th percentile prices are more negatively sensitive over an inde-
pendent variable than the 80th and 90th percentiles, it could be interpreted that price
dispersion increases with the independent variable. However, if the 10th and 20th
percentiles are more positively sensitive than the 80th and 90th percentiles, it could
be interpreted that price dispersion decreases with the independent variable. Also, it
is possible that the effects of an independent variable on the 10th and 20th percentiles
are opposite in direction to those on the 80th and 90th percentiles. According to the
directions and magnitudes of the estimates, the effect of the independent variable on
price dispersion is determined.
2. Estimation Results
To enhance comparability across studies, I perform the Gini log-odds ratio and price
percentile regressions of pooling all routes except the immediately-serviced routes.
Next, the effects of entry threat in the still-threatened routes are compared to those
in the threatened-serviced routes, in order to investigate the motives of incumbents’
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preemptive responses. The results from selecting the immediately-serviced (pre-
announced) routes are reported to see whether incumbents do not reduce price dis-
persion before actual entry when they are informed about Southwest’s entry. Finally,
it is examined how differently incumbents respond when they compete with other
LCCs even before Southwest’s threat.
2.1. Results from Pooling All Threatened Routes
Table VIII presents the results from estimating the Gini log-odds ratio by: (1) pooling
all routes threatened by Southwest, (2) selecting major-carrier routes before threat-
ened by Southwest but then serviced by other LCCs, and (3) selecting mixed-carrier
routes even before threatened by Southwest.27 Essentially, the estimates represent
the effect of each dummy on price dispersion relative to the constant term since all
dummies are exclusively independent. So, the estimates on dummies for threat, entry,
and exit are not additive.
The results obtained from pooling all routes in (1) of Table VIII are generally
consistent with the results in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). The estimates on dum-
mies for entry threat, d(tp) through d(tp + 5 to tp + 12), are negative and mostly
significant at 1 percent level. Moreover, the negative impacts of Southwest’s threat
on an incumbent’s price dispersion seem to be lowered as the threat period gets
longer. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) also find that the average price falls further
as time passes before Southwest entry, and they interpret that these results would
be negatively skewed if Southwest waits longer to enter routes where incumbents cut
fares the most. However, the results from estimating price dispersion indicates that
27The estimation results from selecting major-carrier routes which are never signif-
icantly serviced by any LCCs are reported in in Appendix D, along with the results
from the price percentile regressions for each groups.
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TABLE VIII
Pooling All Threatened Routes
(Dependent Variable: Gloddijt )
pooling all routes mixed-carrier
(1) (2) (3)
NLEG -0.006 -0.004 -0.012**
NLCC -0.000 -0.015 -0.002
dp ·NLCC -0.008 0.011 -0.012
de ·NLCC -0.034** -0.045* -0.015
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) -0.002 0.002 -0.006
d(tp − 4) 0.028 0.001 0.028
d(tp − 3) 0.004 0.003 -0.015
d(tp − 2) -0.040 -0.017 -0.075**
d(tp − 1) -0.026 0.007 -0.057**
d(tp) -0.004 0.029 -0.037
d(tp + 1) -0.075*** -0.051* -0.126***
d(tp + 2) -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.088***
d(tp + 3) -0.053*** -0.064*** -0.068**
d(tp + 4) -0.049** -0.062** -0.070**
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.041*** -0.009 -0.064***
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) 0.022 0.125*** -0.063**
d(te + 1) -0.008 0.110** -0.086***
d(te + 2) 0.004 0.113* -0.077**
d(te + 3) 0.040 0.202*** -0.077**
d(te + 4) 0.009 0.170*** -0.094***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) 0.017 0.162*** -0.087***
Southwest’ Exit:
d(tx) 0.015 0.089** -0.035
d(tx + 1) 0.014 0.077* -0.034
d(tx + 2) -0.027 0.020 -0.061*
d(tx + 3) -0.011 0.036 -0.047
d(tx + 4) -0.022 0.054 -0.074**
Bankruptcy -0.101*** 0.026 -0.158***
Observations 28,585 9,953 13,719
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are clustered by route and are not reported for brevity.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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the continued declines in the average price are (partly) because incumbents also cut
the lower portion of the price distribution.28
According to the results in (1) of Table VIII, price dispersion does not signifi-
cantly change with dummies for actual entry. It is not because incumbents do not
respond to Southwest’s entry but because they cut prices uniformly after actual en-
try.29 The results in (2) and (3) of Table VIII indicate that the estimated effects of
actual entry on price dispersion may be different. They are mixed-carrier routes over
the sample period so that the effects of actual entry would be expected to be negative
like the findings of Lee (2010). It is possible that Southwest’s actual entry stimulates
competition among incumbents so that the lower portion of the price distribution are
much more reduced than the upper portion, which could be the reason of resulting
in a positive effect of actual entry on price dispersion in (3) of Table VIII.30
The estimates on dummies, d(tx) through d(tx + 4), in (1) of Table VIII indicate
that incumbents seem to not change price dispersion when Southwest exits a route.
However, the results from the price percentile regressions indicate that incumbents
adjust higher-end prices quickly up to the level of the constant term whereas they keep
lower-end prices relatively higher than during the entry period but lower than even
during the threat period.31 The declines in the lower-end prices are only observed in
28See Appendix D: Table XV presents that the estimates on dummies for entry
threat are decreasing as time passes in the 10th and 20th percentile regressions.
29See Appendix D: Table XV shows that the estimates on dummies for actual entry
in the percentile regression are significantly negative and similar in magnitude.
30The average of Southwest’s market shares in the routes where incumbents do not
significantly compete with other LCCs before threatened by Southwest is relatively
greater than that in the routes where incumbents compete with other LCCs before
threatened by Southwest. Meanwhile, the standard deviation in the former type of
routes is less than that in the latter type of routes. Thus, incumbents in the former
type of routes are more likely to compete on the rest of the market share, resulting in
reducing the lower portion of the price dispersion much more than the upper portion.
31See Appendix D: in Table XV, the estimates on dummies for exit in the 10th
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the routes selected for (2) of Table VIII, which is related to the continued declines in
the lower-end prices during Southwest’s actual entry. If competition among incum-
bents stimulated by Southwest’s entry induces new demand for relatively cheaper
tickets, incumbents may not instantly increase fares to hold the new customers even
after Southwest exists.
The overall effects of actual competition on price dispersion seem to be generally
consistent with the findings of Lee (2010) which does not consider the competitive
effects of potential competition on price dispersion. The results in (1), (3), and (4) of
Table VIII show that the negative effects of competition on price dispersion are mostly
due to the competitive effects of other LCCs. The negative effects of the number of
major airlines in (3) and (4) of Table VIII are partly because they reduce price
dispersion preemptively during the threat period and partly because they compete
with other LCCs.
More importantly, Table VIII depicts how important sample selection is in ana-
lyzing the competitive effects of the threat of entry on price dispersion. Particularly,
since Southwest’s entry decision has a self-selection problem reflecting whether it an-
nounces its entry and so incumbents do not deter entry preemptively, pooling all
threatened routes may mislead to (asymptotically) biased estimates for the threat of
entry. Moreover, since the regression model includes lots of dummy variables, there
would be gains and losses in directly controlling for incumbents’ preemptive responses
affected by other incumbent LCCs. Instead, the paper primarily investigates incum-
bents’ preemptive responses in the routes where incumbents compete against one
another before threated by Southwest, like the routes used in (2) of Table VIII.
and 20th price percentile regressions are negative and significant at 5 percent level,
whereas the estimates in the 80th and 90th price percentile regressions are mostly
insignificant.
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2.2. Different Responses to the Threat of Entry
First of all, I look at the still-threatened routes among the major-carrier routes before
Southwest’s presence in both endpoints.32 The estimated coefficients on dummies for
entry threat, d(tp) through d(tp + 5 to tp + 12), in Table IX suggest that incumbents
respond to Southwest’s threat of entry by cutting the upper portion of the price dis-
tribution after tp. The estimates on dummies for entry threat from the 80th and 90th
percentile regressions are around -1 and relatively persistent over time, while those
from the 10th and 20th percentile regressions are mostly insignificant. These results
sugget that incumbents significantly reduce price dispersion preemptively in response
to Southwest’s threat of entry, in the still-threatened routes where incumbents are
uncertain about Southwest’s actual entry. Incumbents in these routes may know that
Southwest does not begin service at tp, but that it can service non-stop flights any-
time after tp, which could be the reason why incumbents do not respond before tp
but significantly reduce price dispersion after tp.
It is surprising that the estimated competitive effects of major airlines in Table
IX is negative and significant at 5 percent level. Lee (2010) shows that competition
has a positive effect on price dispersion when major airlines compete against one
other. However, the estimates on the number of major airlines seem to be opposite to
the finding in Lee (2010). When the competitive effects of major airlines during the
threat period is isolated by using dp ·NLEG, the results indicate that price dispersion
increases with the number of major airlines before threatened by Southwest. Since
incumbents reduce price dispersion preemptively to the threat of entry, a new entry
32Four routes which have been serviced by Southwest after the end of the sample
period (2006:Q3) are included in the estimation: Denver-Spokane (2010:Q1), Log
Angeles-San Francisco (2007:Q4), Philadelphia-St. Louis (2008:Q1), and Raleigh-
Durham-St. Louis (2010:Q2). The results hold though these four routes are excluded.
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TABLE IX
Selecting Still-threatened Routes
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.016** 0.000 -0.005 -0.009 -0.015**
NLCC -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 0.011 -0.021
dp ·NLCC -0.007 -0.018 -0.033 -0.057** -0.038
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) 0.053 0.002 -0.029 0.011 0.057
d(tp − 4) 0.065 0.016 -0.033 -0.091 0.030
d(tp − 3) 0.002 0.015 -0.038 -0.143** 0.007
d(tp − 2) 0.055 -0.004 -0.042 -0.099 -0.008
d(tp − 1) 0.012 0.030 0.006 0.026 -0.009
d(tp) -0.051 0.040 0.031 -0.016 0.006
d(tp + 1) -0.090** 0.014 0.010 -0.083* -0.091*
d(tp + 2) -0.114*** 0.021 0.011 -0.103** -0.082*
d(tp + 3) -0.079*** 0.001 -0.022 -0.076 -0.127***
d(tp + 4) -0.099*** 0.020 -0.020 -0.158*** -0.142***
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.053*** -0.037* -0.053** -0.116*** -0.092***
Bankruptcy -0.005 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.009 0.053
Observations 5,399 5,399 5,399 5,399 5,399
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are clustered by route and are not reported for brevity.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
of major airlines may also reduce price dispersion during the threat period.
Next, I look at the threatened-serviced routes among the major-carrier routes
before threatened by Southwest, which is presented in Table X. In these routes, in-
cumbents are more likely to be informed about Southwest’s future entry, and thus
they may not signficantly reduce price disperion for entry deterrence. Goolsbee and
Syverson (2008) address that incumbents in a route do respond preemptively to the
threat of entry regardless of whether Southwest serviced later. In contrast, the es-
timates on dummies for entry threat, d(tp) through d(tp + 5 to tp + 12), are mostly
insignificant, as shown in Table X. Suggestively, if incumbents are privately known
about the timing of Southwest’s future entry at tp, they might have no motives to
67
TABLE X
Selecting Threatened-serviced Routes
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG 0.011 -0.011* -0.012* -0.016* -0.007
NLCC -0.024 0.039 0.050 0.002 0.069**
dp ·NLCC 0.035 -0.074** -0.087*** -0.037 -0.104***
de ·NLCC -0.034 -0.042 -0.049 -0.012 -0.100***
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) -0.033 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.193*** 0.105**
d(tp − 4) -0.035 0.103** 0.122** 0.159** 0.087
d(tp − 3) 0.026 0.099* 0.077 0.117* 0.046
d(tp − 2) -0.051 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.170*** 0.082*
d(tp − 1) 0.005 0.116** 0.120** 0.148*** 0.106**
d(tp) 0.095** 0.001 -0.007 0.066 0.072
d(tp + 1) -0.007 0.049 0.070* 0.038 0.057
d(tp + 2) -0.008 0.049 0.048 0.041 0.053
d(tp + 3) -0.024 0.089** 0.065* 0.052 0.052
d(tp + 4) -0.032 0.017 0.014 0.008 -0.014
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) 0.063 -0.008 -0.015 -0.021 0.027
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) 0.128*** -0.176*** -0.166*** -0.129*** -0.077**
d(te + 1) 0.105* -0.301*** -0.351*** -0.281*** -0.202***
d(te + 2) 0.123** -0.325*** -0.334*** -0.281*** -0.259***
d(te + 3) 0.197*** -0.293*** -0.332*** -0.205*** -0.181***
d(te + 4) 0.163*** -0.296*** -0.312*** -0.203*** -0.175***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) 0.169*** -0.242*** -0.208*** -0.162*** -0.108**
Southwest’ Exit:
d(tx) 0.049 -0.085*** -0.102*** -0.027 0.007
d(tx + 1) 0.035 -0.062** -0.065** -0.044 -0.018
d(tx + 2) -0.030 -0.067** -0.046 -0.054 -0.048
d(tx + 3) -0.000 -0.063** -0.045* -0.042 -0.048
d(tx + 4) 0.022 -0.071** -0.052* -0.034 -0.001
Bankruptcy 0.035 -0.071** -0.073** -0.127*** -0.109***
Observations 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are clustered by route and are not reported for brevity.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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deter Southwest’s entry by cutting prices or reducing price dispersion. Though there
are no significant price declines in these routes, the results do not indicate that there
would no incumbents’ preemptive responses of discounting ticket fares and/or up-
grading customer services like frequent flyer miles.33 As discussed earlier, incumbents
may engage in locking in more valuable customers by generating switching cost with
other ways rather than directly reducing price dispersion.
The reason that incumbents increase prices before tp in the threatened-serviced
routes seems not to be obvious, because incumbents in the still-threatened routes
do not significantly respond before tp. However, if incumbents are informed about
Southwest’s future entery prior to tp, they may engage in locking in valuable customers
as much as possible, resulting in possible increases in ticket fares. If incumbents are
uncertain about Southwest’s entry prior to tp, they don’t have any motives to deter or
accommodate entry preemptively even before Southwest’s presence in both endpoints
at tp. As a result, the estimates on dummies, d(tp− 8 to tp− 5) through d(tp− 1), in
the price percentile regressions for the threatened-serviced routes as shown in Table
X, are mostly around 0.l and significant at 10 percent level or less, whereas those for
the still-threatened routes are mostly insignificant.
When Southwest actually enter a route among the threatened-serviced routes,
incumbents do not reduce price dispersion. They cut lower-end prices much more than
higher-end prices, resulting in increased price disperion. The estimates on dummies
for actual entry, d(te) through d(te + 5 to te + 8), from the 10th and 20th percentile
regressions, are around -0.3 and significant at 1 percent level. They are also larger in
33US Airways which accounts for more than 68 percent passengers from and to
Philadelphia started to service “unbelievable acts of kindness” - from putting money
in customers’ parking meters to providing cheese steaks even before Southwest’s entry
while it was known to delay matching fares with Southwest. See Speer (2006) and
Mohl (2006).
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absolute value than those from the 80th and 90th percentile regressions. The estimates
on dummies for actual entry from the 80th and 90th percentile regressions are around
-0.2 and significant at at least 5 percent level. As mentioned earlier, Southwest may
stimulate incumbents to compete against one another so that lower-end prices are
reduced to a greater extent.
These reduction in lower-end prices may generate new demand for flights. As
a result, even when Southwest exits a route among the threatened-serviced route,
incumbents tend to slightly reduce lower-end prices relative to the excluded period
while they increase lower-end prices relative to the entry peirod. In contrast, they
adjust higher-end prices quickly up to the level before the threat and entry periods.
The estimates on dummies for exit, d(tx) through d(tx + 4), from the 10th and 20th
price percentile regressions, are significantly around -0.05, whereas those from the
80th and 90th price percentile regressions are all insignificant.
It is distinguishable from the results of Goolsbee and Syverson (2009) that in-
cumbents reduce price disperion preemptively in response to Southwest’s entry threat
in the still-threatened routes. In the threatened-serviced routes, they do not reduce
price disperion preemptively. If incumbents in the threatened-serviced routes are
privately or publicly informed about Southwest’s future entry, they may not be actu-
ally threatened by Southwest’s presence in both enpoints though they are seemlingly
threatened.
Table XI presents how incumbents respond to pre-announced entry. Since South-
west always announces new non-stop flights when it begins service at a new airport,
incumbents is not able to deter Southwest’s entry in these routes, so they may choose
to accommodate it by locking in more profitable customers. The estimates on dum-
mies for prior to actual entry, d(te−8 to te−5) through d(te−1), are mostly insignif-
icant. That is, these results suggest that incumbents do not reduce price disperion
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TABLE XI
Selecting Immediately-serviced Routes
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.028*** 0.017*** 0.015** -0.005 -0.003
NLCC 0.038** -0.004 -0.010 -0.014 0.009
dp ·NLCC -0.087*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.040* 0.077***
de ·NLCC -0.055** -0.022 -0.016 -0.021 -0.051***
Southwest’ Announcement:
d(te − 8 to te − 5) -0.010 -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.035
d(te − 4) 0.050 -0.067* -0.052 -0.034 -0.023
d(te − 3) -0.031 0.029 0.003 -0.010 -0.038
d(te − 2) -0.010 0.050* 0.028 0.052 0.013
d(te − 1) -0.089*** 0.066** 0.044 0.045 -0.013
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) -0.099** -0.067** -0.109*** -0.177*** -0.150***
d(te + 1) -0.145*** -0.123*** -0.157*** -0.301*** -0.257***
d(te + 2) -0.156*** -0.095*** -0.156*** -0.274*** -0.254***
d(te + 3) -0.099*** -0.121*** -0.149*** -0.236*** -0.233***
d(te + 4) -0.092** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.148*** -0.183***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) -0.117*** -0.145*** -0.157*** -0.177*** -0.194***
Southwest’ Exit:
d(tx) -0.115* -0.198*** -0.218*** -0.159*** -0.314***
d(tx + 1) -0.191** -0.035 -0.108* -0.132*** -0.186***
d(tx + 2) -0.124* 0.028 -0.035 -0.038 -0.087*
d(tx + 3) -0.120 0.024 -0.030 -0.014 -0.076
d(tx + 4) -0.073 0.001 -0.010 -0.001 0.033
Bankruptcy -0.172*** -0.006 0.007 -0.090*** -0.134***
Observations 7,782 7,782 7,782 7,782 7,782
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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in response to the pre-announed entry though they have motives to accommodate it,
like in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
However, these results are obtained from the routes where incumbents compete
with other LCCs before Southwest’s entry. The number of the major-carrier routes
before Southwest’s entry is not sufficient to perform the regressions. If I include
the other immediatelty-serviced routes, the estimates on d(te − 4) through d(te − 1)
from the price percentile regressions are rather positive34, contrasted to the result
in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) that prices do not significantly fall nor increase
in the pre-announced routes in their sample. First of all, the results suggest that
incumbents do not reduce prices nor price disperion when they are not able to deter
Southwet’s entry or when they are infomred about Southwest’s entry. So, as a result
of incumbents’ entry accommodation, they upgrading service qualities, resulting in
increasing ticket fares. Next, the different results between the two studies can be
explained by the difference between the two studies’ sampling. Goolsbee and Syverson
(2009) do not use the T-100 data in estimating the average price. So, their sample
must include mixed-carrier routes before entry relative to my sample, which is because
the results from the mixed-carrier routes before entry among the immediately-serviced
routes are consistent with the results in Goolsbee and Syveron (2008).35
In short, if incumbents do not reduce price dispersion when they are informed
34Table XIX in Appendix ?? indicate that incumbents seem to increase prices before
actual entry. The estimates on d(te−4) through d(te−1), are positive and significant
at 5 percent level or less
35Since direct flights with few passengers are not reported in the T-100 data, the
routes where major airlines compete with low-cost carrier are dropped when the DB1B
and T-100 data are merged. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) includs 223 immediately-
servcied routes in their sample, while I have 123 routes. That is, the immediately-
serviced routes in Goolsbee and Syverson’s sample are mostly likely to be mixed-
carrier routes as much as the difference in the number of immediately-serviced route
between the two studies.
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TABLE XII
Selecting Still-threatened routes among the Mixed-carrier Routes before
Threat
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.011 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.007 0.017**
NLCC -0.017 -0.039*** -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.074***
dp ·NLCC -0.003 0.005 0.013 0.031 0.006
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) -0.041 -0.034 -0.031 -0.060 -0.096**
d(tp − 4) 0.003 -0.041* -0.035 -0.085** -0.062
d(tp − 3) -0.028 -0.043 -0.055** -0.126*** -0.114***
d(tp − 2) -0.197*** 0.012 0.018 -0.116*** -0.149***
d(tp − 1) -0.129*** -0.018 -0.018 -0.102** -0.130***
d(tp) -0.069 -0.079** -0.073** -0.153*** -0.132***
d(tp + 1) -0.136*** -0.043 -0.057* -0.173*** -0.169***
d(tp + 2) -0.102*** -0.056* -0.068** -0.126*** -0.158***
d(tp + 3) -0.055 -0.069* -0.083** -0.127** -0.113**
d(tp + 4) -0.023 -0.086** -0.095** -0.109** -0.127***
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.074* -0.051* -0.044* -0.080* -0.111**
Bankruptcy -0.186*** 0.001 0.011 -0.111*** -0.170***
Observations 6,938 6,938 6,938 6,938 6,938
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
about Southwest’s future entry, incumbents’ preemptive reduction in price disperion
before entry can be interpreted as entry deterrence even though they seem to be
threatened by Southwest’s presence in both endpoints. Also, if incumbents reduce
price disperion preemptively for entry deterrence, Southwest may dicouarge incum-
bents from reducing price disperion by announcing or revealing its’ future entry.
2.3. When Incumbents Compete with other LCCs Before Threatened by Southwest
Table XII shows the results from estimating price dispersion in the mixed-carrier
routes before threat among the still-threatened routes. In these routes, incumbents
73
TABLE XIII
Selecting Threatened-serviced Routes among the Mixed-carrier Routes
before Threat and Serviced
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.013** 0.007* 0.007* 0.002 0.002
NLCC 0.025* -0.007 -0.016* -0.016 0.003
dp ·NLCC -0.030** -0.029*** -0.019** -0.011 -0.042***
de ·NLCC -0.041** -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.070***
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) 0.035 -0.040* -0.051** -0.025 0.013
d(tp − 4) 0.043 -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.087*** -0.059
d(tp − 3) -0.016 -0.074*** -0.105*** -0.116*** -0.141***
d(tp − 2) 0.022 -0.098*** -0.111*** -0.085*** -0.104***
d(tp − 1) -0.015 -0.081*** -0.092*** -0.057 -0.101***
d(tp) -0.022 -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.082***
d(tp + 1) -0.074** -0.028 -0.031 -0.045 -0.090***
d(tp + 2) -0.062** 0.018 0.008 -0.004 -0.034
d(tp + 3) -0.091*** 0.027 0.008 -0.010 -0.059*
d(tp + 4) -0.096** 0.019 -0.003 -0.021 -0.095***
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.012 -0.059*** -0.039** -0.017 -0.073***
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) -0.213*** -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.166*** -0.182***
d(te + 1) -0.208*** -0.050** -0.066** -0.180*** -0.177***
d(te + 2) -0.240*** -0.079*** -0.097*** -0.221*** -0.224***
d(te + 3) -0.206*** -0.074*** -0.092*** -0.174*** -0.180***
d(te + 4) -0.166*** -0.091*** -0.082*** -0.170*** -0.172***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) -0.129*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.126*** -0.139***
Southwest’ Exit:
d(tx) -0.044 -0.013 -0.018 0.007 -0.056**
d(tx + 1) -0.035 -0.022 -0.009 0.024 -0.038
d(tx + 2) -0.068** -0.015 -0.009 -0.037 -0.062**
d(tx + 3) -0.052 -0.031 -0.021 -0.015 -0.038
d(tx + 4) -0.044 -0.037 -0.034 -0.045 -0.084**
Bankruptcy -0.080** -0.026 -0.030 -0.081*** -0.133***
Observations 9,769 9,769 9,769 9,769 9,769
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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reduce price dispersion even before tp. The estimates on dummies, d(tp − 3) through
d(tp − 1), in (4) and (5) of Table XII are around -0.12. After Southwest’s presence
in both endpoints, incumbent also reduce the upper portion of the price distribution
much more than the lower portion. Moreover, incumbents’ price cuts are persistent
from d(tp − 3). The estimates on dummies for entry threat, d(tp) through d(tp +
5 to tp + 12), are negative as much as those on dummies for before threat.
Table XIII shows the results from estimating price dispersion in the mixed-carrier
routes before threat among the threatened-serviced routes. Before Southwest’s pres-
ence in both endpoints, incumbents seem to reduce the upper portion of the price
distribution much more than the lower portion. The estimates on dummies, d(tp− 3)
through d(tp − 1), in (2) through (5) of Table XIII, are mostly significantly negative
at 1 percent level.36 However, after Southwest’s presence in both endpoints, incum-
bents do not significantly cut the 10th, 20th, and 80th percentiles, except the 90th
percentile price. Generally, incumbents’ responses to Southwest’s presence in both
endpoints are consistent with those in the major-carrier routes before threatened by
Southwest, which are depending on whether Southwest serviced later or on whether
incumbents are informed about Southwest’s future entry.
D. Summary
The paper examines when incumbents respond preemptively to the threat of entry,
reflecting two possible separating equilibria in the airline industry when threatened
by Southwest. When a potential rival signals its entry, incumbents do not deter the
rival’s entry. Otherwise, incumbent deter the rival’s entry by reducing prices. Instead
of looking at the average price like Goolsbee and Syverson (2009), the paper analyzes
36The price cuts even before Southwest’s presence would be due to other LCCs’
preemptive responses.
75
how incumbents adjust their discriminatory pricing preemptively in response to the
threat of entry.
The primary finding is that incumbents do not always reduce price dispersion
when threatened by Southwest. Even when they seem to be threatened by Southwest’s
presence in both endpoints, incumbents do not significantly reduce price dispersion
in the routes where Southwest entered later. In these routes, incumbents don’t have
motives to deter Southwest’s entry since they may be informed about Southwest’s
entry even before the announcements. So, only when incumbents are uncertain about
Southwest’s entry, they do significantly reduce price disperion in a hope of deter-
ring Southwest’s entry. As suggestive evidence on how incumbents respond when
incumbents are possibly informed about Southwest’s future entry, the paper analyzes
the cases when Southwest immediately entered upon establishing presence in both
endpoints. The results support that incumbents do not significantly reduce price dis-
persion when they are informed about Southwest’s entry. Thus, if incumbents reduce
price dispersion preemptively to deter Southwest’s entry, Southwest may discourage
incumbents from deterring its entry by informing its future entry.
The paper documents the effects of exit on price dispersion. When Southwest
exits a route, incumbents adjust higher-end prices quickly up to the level before the
threat or entry periods. They also increase lower-end prices relative to the entry
period but still discount lower-end prices relative to the excluded period, in order to
service new demand stimulated by Southwest’s actual entry. Moreover, as a result of
controllying potential competition, incumbents reduce price disperion in response to
a new entry of major airlines during the period when they reduce price disperion in
a hope of deterring Southwest’s entry. Otherwise, the results on the relationship of
market competition and price disperion are consistent with the findings of Lee (2010).
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CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECTS OF ISSUER COMPETITION ON THE CREDIT
CARD INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
It is a well-established economic principle that higher levels of competition lead to
lower prices. In the credit card industry, empirical data described in Weiner and
Wright (2005) indicate that competition among card issuers has played an opposite
role of increasing interchange fees which are paid by merchants to issuers for con-
sumers’ card payments.1 This puzzling positive relationship between competition
and interchange fees has received little attention in the literature.2
The paper analyzes the issuing side of the credit card industry by assuming a
standard Cournot oligopoly market, based on the framework of Rochet and Tirole
(2002). The card payment industry is a two-sided market with positive externalities:
it requires a platform such as Visa or MasterCard (a card association) to connect
the issuing and acquiring sides of the market. On the issuing side, the customer fee
and the interchange fee are determined in equilibrium as functions of the number
of issuers, respectively. The customer fee is a fee paid by consumers to issuers for
card purchases. On the acquiring side, the acquirers are assumed to be perfectly
1See Appendix E: “Only a weak” positive correlation between competition and
the average interchange fee becomes clear, if not including the data of 1998-99 when
Citibank switched to MasterCard. The Herfindahl index for concentration measure
is calculated by using the Top 20 issuers of Visa from 1990 to 2003.
2See Chakravorti (2003) and Verdier (2009). Most studies focus on whether high
interchange fees are good for social welfare: Baxter(1983), Carlton and Frankel (1995),
Frankel (1998), Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002,2003a, 2003b, 2006,
2008), Wright (2003,2004), Rochet and Wright (2009), Wang (2010). Moreover, dis-
cussions on competition are about platform competition: Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Chakravorti and Rosen (2006), Armstrong (2006), Guthrie and Wright (2007), Ma-
nenti and Somma (2009).
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competitive and thus they pass through the interchange fee to the merchants.
The model assumes a single card association (called a platform). It imposes the
no-surcharge rule that restricts merchants to set the same price for cash and card
purchases. The roles of the no-surcharge rule has been controversial across studies.
It has been viewed as a necessary instrument for internalizing the positive network
externalities and thus maximizing welfare.3 In contrast, it has been also viewed as
an anti-competitive legal imposition for issuers’ leveraging their market power within
the association.4
Intuitively, under the no-surcharge rule, issuers (members of the platform) have
a collective interest in setting the interchange fee such that all merchants accept the
credit cards. Since the issuers’ profits are increasing in the interchange fee, they will
set the largest interchange fee resulting in all merchants’ card acceptance. Moreover,
under the no-surcharge rule, merchants pass through the interchange fee to the con-
sumers, but the consumers are not informed about the level of the interchange fee,
since all they observe is the retail price. Subsequently, the paper shows that the in-
terchange fee increases with competition since the issuers can compensate losses from
competing on the issuing side by collectively increasing the interchange fee.
In contrast, Rochet and Tirole (2002) implicitly show that the interchange fee
is decreasing in competition. In their model, they assume that the customer fee is
a sunk cost. Thus, the customer fee does not directly affect either the consumers’
decision of selecting a merchant or the merchants’ decision of accepting the cards. I
follow Wright (2003, 2010), by modeling the customer fee as a fee per transaction,
which leads to the result that the interchange fee increases with competition while the
3See Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003) and Evans and Schmalensee (2005).
4See Frankel (1998), Carlton and Frankel (1995), and Gans and King (2003).
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customer fee decreases. Rosenthal (1980) shows a similar setting of price-increasing
competition: competition lowers the price of a common market, but increases that
of a captive market. In this context, the issuing side is the common market to the
issuers, and the acquiring side is the captive market since the issuers can collectively
charge the interchange fee to the merchants under the no-surcharge rule.
The paper also analyzes the effect of the competition policy. It shows that
limiting competition may increase social welfare under the no-surcharge rule. An
ssuer must be a member of the association to provide its card payment services
through the platform, and thus the association serves a barrier for entry or exit.
That is, even though the privately optimal number of issuers is less than the number
of member issuers, no issuers will exit the market as long as their profit is positive.
As a result, there would be too many issuers so that the customer fee is lower and
the interchange fee is higher than the socially optimal levels. In this case, limiting
competition improves social welfare.
If the no-surcharge rule restricts issuers to compete only on the customer fee,
lifting the no-surcharge rule may induce issuers to compete over the total fee includ-
ing the interchange fee. Without the no-surcharge rule, the total fee paid by the
consumers decreases with competition among issuers. If the issuers collectively de-
termine the interchange fee even after the no-surcharge rule is lifted, the privately
optimal fee is greater than the socially optimal level so that the card payment services
are under-provisioned. It suggests that a fee policy can restrict a potential collusion
even after abolishing the no-surcharge rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Subsection B outlines the model.
Subsection C derives the equilibrium by using backward induction. Subsection D
discusses the welfare implications of limiting competition under the no-surcharge rule
and abolishing the no-surcharge rule. Subsection E concludes.
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B. The Model
There is a single payment card association.5 It operates a platform that interconnects
issuers and acquires who offer credit card services to the consumers and merchants,
respectively. Figure 9 depicts the flow of card payment services. A consumer pur-
chases a unit of goods at the retail price p with a credit card from a merchant. The
merchant requests its bank (acquirer) to acquire the transaction made with the card.
The acquirer sends its merchant the amount of p −m where m is the merchant fee.
It asks the consumer’s bank (issuer) to interchange the transaction with the amount
of p − fI where fI is the interchange fee. Then, the consumer pays the issuer the
amount of p+ fC where fC is the customer fee.
6
The issuing side is a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with n firms. The acquiring
side is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that the issuing side is the focus of
the analysis. Consumers have a fixed number of transactions, normalized to one
transaction per consumer, and merchants are homogeneous competing in a spatially
differentiated market.
5The paper focuses on an open platform like Visa and MasterCard. A platform is
open if the platform is jointly operated by its members (issuers). A platform is closed
if the platform plays roles of issuers and acquirers. American Express is an example
of closed platform. See Manenti and Somma (2009).
6In practice, a credit card has a grace period from the point of purchase to the
payment due date, and neither interest nor fees are charged on the credit card during
the grace period.
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Fig. 9.—Flow of Card Payment Service
1. Card Association
The association requires its members to pay an access cost l(n;α) per transaction
where n is the number of members and α is the state of technology 7:
∂l(n;α)
∂n
< 0;
∂2l(n;α)
∂n2
> 0, (4.1)
∂l(n;α)
∂α
< 0;
∂2l(n;α)
∂α2
> 0. (4.2)
I assume that the state of technology is exogenously given, and denote the initial value
by α0. The assumptions on the access cost reflect that the platform has increasing
economies of scale and that its cost efficiency also depends on the level of technological
7For instance, the marginal access cost may depend on the speed of telecommu-
nication since credit card payments are made through the infrastructure of telecom-
munication that are exogenously determined.
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advancements.
The association imposes a no-surcharge rule on merchants who accept its mem-
bers’ credit cards. It requires uniform pricing for cash and credit purchases. The
association maximizes the total profit of its members by setting the interchange fee
such that all merchants accept its platform cards.
2. Consumers
Each consumer seeks to acquire a single indivisible good of value ν, which can be either
through cash or card. Consumers are heterogeneous in their convenience benefit bB
from using a payment card, which is related to the transactional cost of cash. The
benefit bB is drawn from a uniform distribution H(bB) with support [bB, b¯B]. If all
merchants accept the card, a consumer with benefit bB will choose to use her card if
bB ≥ fC . Thus, the total demand for card payment service will be
D(fC) = 1−H(fC). (4.3)
Thus, given that the consumers with bB ≥ fC transact using the credit cards and
those with bB < fC do not, the expected benefit enjoyed by the consumers who pay
by card is expressed by
β(fC) ≡ E[bB|bB ≥ fC ] =
∫ b¯B
fC
bBdH(dB)
1−H(fC) (4.4)
3. Issuers
Each issuer’s marginal cost is cI+l(n;α), so the issuing side consists of n homogeneous
issuers. The issuers are all members of the card association and they use the same
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brand of the association like Visa or MasterCard on their cards.8 The issuing side is
not a free-entry market in this model since a bank is not allowed to issue the platform-
branded card and to use the platform if it is not a member. The issuers within the
platform compete for customers in a Cournot oligopoly market. Each issuer chooses
the quantity of card payment services so that the equilibrium customer fee, fC , is
determined by the equilibrium quantity.
4. Acquirers
Acquirers are perfectly competitive having constant marginal cost, cA. Therefore,
they set their price equal to their marginal cost:
m = fI + cA, (4.5)
where m is the merchant fee paid by merchants to acquirers. In this model, acquirers
play a role of passing through the interchange fee to the merchants.
5. Merchants
Merchants compete in the standard Hotelling linear city, like in Rochet and Tirole
(2002). Consumers are uniformly located between two merchants, a segment of the
market with length of 1. There may be an arbitrary number of such segments, and
each part of merchants are selling the identical goods at the endpoints of the seg-
ment. Each consumer in the linear segment incurs a transportation cost t per unit of
distance. Each merchant has constant marginal cost including cash transaction cost,
8See Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and Manenti and Somma
(2009) for competition among platforms. Armstrong (2006) present three cases: i)
a monopoly platform, ii) a model of competing platforms where agents join a sin-
gle platform, and iii) a model of competitive bottleneck where one group joins all
platforms.
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d, and obtains benefit per card transaction, bS. Merchants’ benefit from accepting
cards are assumed to be homogeneous across merchants.
Besides choosing his retail price, each merchant also decides whether to accept
credit cards. If he chooses to accept credit cards, the no-surcharge rule restricts the
merchant to charge the same price for cash and credit card purchases. That is, the
two decisions are sequential: whether to accept credit cards is followed by setting
price.9
6. Decision Timing
The use of a credit card is associated with benefits for each merchant who accepts
cards and each consumer who pays by card. The model assumes that it is not socially
optimal for all consumers to pay by card: for all n and α,
bB + bS < cI + l(n;α) + cA < b¯B + bS. (4.6)
That is, given n and α, there always exist some cash purchases in the economy.
If cI + l(n;α) + cA < bB + bS for some n, limiting competition can improve social
welfare, which could be an arbitrary result driven by the condition of cI+l(n;α)+cA <
bB + bS.
10
The decision timing is as follows:
Stage 1 : The association sets the interchange fee, and the issuers set the customer
fee on the issuing side.
9The same equilibrium is obtained when the two decisions are simultaneous, be-
cause in equilibrium all merchants are symmetric in their choice of accepting credit
cards and because the model assumes that the merchants are homogeneous in conve-
nience benefits.
10If issuers incur a non-trivial but small fixed-cost to enter the market, limiting
competition can improve social welfare in any cases. In the model, I assume no fixed
cost that is consistent with the condition (4.6).
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Stage 2 : Merchants decide whether to accept payment cards, which becomes
publicly observable.
Stage 3 : Merchants set their prices simultaneously.
Stage 4 : Consumers observe merchants’ retail prices, choose their payment
method, and visit a merchant of their choice.
The solution concept employed here is Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. The
following subsection derives the equilibrium by using backward induction. (all proofs
are provided in Appendix F)
C. The Privately Optimal Fees
Let f ∗C be the customer fee in a symmetric Cournot Oligopoly equilibrium. Consumers
with bB < f
∗
C will choose to pay by cash while consumers with bB ≥ f ∗C will choose
to pay by card. If all merchants accept the platform cards and set the same price on
cash and card, consumers located at xi will choose merchant i if
ν − pi + txi ≥ ν − pj + t(1− xi)
where xi becomes the merchant i’s market share.
Merchants can accept or not accept credit cards and then set the retail price
in a segment of length 1. Lemma 1 shows that there exits an equilibrium, in which
the association sets the largest interchange fee such that all merchants accept credit
cards.
Lemma 1. Let f ∗C and f
∗
I be the equilibrium customer and interchange fees, respec-
tively, under the no-surcharge rule.
(i) There exists an equilibrium in which all merchants accept the card if and only if
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fI ≤ f¯I where f¯I is given by
β(f ∗C)− f ∗C = f¯I + cA − bS. (4.7)
(ii) The equilibrium interchange fee will be the largest interchange fee such that all
merchants accept the platform cards:
f ∗I = f¯I .
It is worth noting that the equilibrium customer fee f ∗C is a function of cA − fI .
Thus, the largest interchange fee f¯I is given by equation (4.7). Lemma 1 - (i) reveals
that all merchants accept the cards if the average total benefit (β(f ∗C)+ bS) is at least
as large as the average total cost (f ∗C + fI + cA).
11 Lemma 1 - (ii) is obvious since the
total profit of issuers is increasing over the interchange fee: ∂pitotal/∂fI > 0. So, the
largest interchange fee f¯I is the privately optimal level under the no-surcharge rule.
Note that issuers do not compete on the interchange fee under the no-surcharge
rule. When all merchants accept the cards and set the identical price on cash and card
purchases, consumers are not informed about the interchange fee and thus merchants
do not care about the interchange fee as long as the condition (4.7) is satisfied.
Therefore, even when the interchange fee is independently set by each issuer, the
equilibrium interchange fee will be f¯I .
12
Let k ≡ b¯B − bB. The demand for card payment services at fC will be given by
11In Rochet and Tirole (2002), the condition is given as β(f ∗C) = fI + cA− bS since
they assume that the customer fee is a sunk cost to cardholders. They show that the
largest interchange fee is uniquely determined given by β(f ∗C) = fI + cA − bS in their
analysis.
12It is driven that issuers are homogeneous in cost. It is possible that all issuers
will not agree with the level of the interchange fee set by the association if they are
heterogeneous. However, since all issuers are within the platform, the interchange fee
is likely to be set enough to cover the marginal cost of the most inefficient member.
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D(fC) = 1−H(fC) where H(fC) = 1k (fC − bB). Then, the inverse demand for card
payment services is
fC = b¯B − k
n∑
j=1
qj. (4.8)
Since the issuing side is a Cournot Oligopoly market, the equilibrium customer fee
is determined through the profit-maximizing quantity of card payment services. So,
each issuer solves,
max
qi
(b¯B − k
n∑
j=1
qj + fI − cI − l(n;α))qi. (4.9)
given fI ≤ f¯I .
Proposition 1. Under the no-surcharge rule, the equilibrium fees are given by
f ∗C(n) = b¯B −
2n
(n+ 2)
(b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA), (4.10)
f ∗I (n) = cI + l(n;α)− b¯B +
2(n+ 1)
(n+ 2)
(b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA), (4.11)
yielding
∂f ∗C(n)
∂n
< 0 ;
∂f ∗I (n)
∂n
> 0. (4.12)
In contrast, Rochet and Tirole (2002) shows that both fees are decreasing with
competition under the assumption that the customer fee is a sunk cost. If the cus-
tomer fee is a sunk cost, it does not affect the consumers’ decision of selecting a mer-
chant, and also does not directly affect the merchants’ decision of accepting credit
cards.13 Proposition 1 occurs only if the customer fee is a fee per transaction, not a
sunk cost.14
13If the customer fee is a sunk cost, the merchant not accepting the cards will have
the market share among consumers with bB > f
∗
C such that pi+tx
r
i = pj+t(1−xri )−bB.
Condition (4.7) will become β(f ∗C) = f¯I + cA − bS as in Rochet and Tirole (2002).
14Wright (2003, 2010) also assumes that the customer fee is a fee per transaction
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Interestingly, the customer fee could be negative in equilibrium whenever the
privately optimal number of issuers is larger. Let n˜ be 2n/(n + 2). Note that 2
3
≤
n˜ < 2. Then, the condition for a negative customer fee from (4.10) is given by
(b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA) > 1
n˜
b¯B.
Proposition 2 addresses that the association serves a barrier for entry and exit.
That is, incumbent issuers may not agree with new entry unless they are able to
compensate losses from competing in the issuing side by increasing the interchange
fee in equilibrium. Let g(n) = b¯B + bS− cI − l(n;α)− cA for brevity. From (4.10) and
(4.11), issuer i’s profit is given by
pii(n) =
4
k(n+ 2)2
g(n)2. (4.13)
Proposition 2. Under the no-surcharge rule, there exists an (unique) n∗ that max-
imizes an individual issuer’s profit function.
It can be shown that n∗ = 1 if the marginal access cost, l(n;α), is constant,
because the profit function is monotonic decreasing in n when l(n;α) is constant.
Therefore, the assumption of increasing economies of scale derives the equilibrium
result of n∗ > 1. Two examples describe a unique solution given the functional forms
of l(n;α) as follow.15
 Example 1. Assume l(n;α) = 1/αn for α > 0 and n > 0, satisfying (4.1)
and (4.2). The privately optimal number of issuers n∗ is uniquely determined at√
2/α(b¯B + bS − cI − cA).
 Example 2. Assume l(n;α) = 1/α√n for α > 0 and n > 0, satisfying (4.1)
for using cards.
15The condition for a concave profit fuction with respect to n is addressed in the
proof of Proposition 2, See Appendix F.
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and (4.2). The privately optimal number of issuers n∗ uniquely solves α(b¯B + bS −
cI − cA)n 32 + 12n− 1 = 0.16
Given the state of technology by α, Proposition 2 implies that the association
does not allow any entry if the number of members is equal to the privately optimal
number of issuers, n∗. However, given the number of issuers by some n, any issuers
will not exit the market even if n∗ < n. It can be shown that n∗ decreases with α (see
Example 1 ). Meanwhile, since pii(n) increases with α, no issuers will exit the market
as long as they are already the members of the association. As a result, there would
be too many issuers so that the customer fee is too low and the interchange fee is too
high. In this case, limiting competition may result in improved social welfare.
It is worth noting that the privately optimal number of issuers will be one if the
marginal access cost is constant or independent of the number of issuers. Moreover,
the assumption of the state of technology on the marginal access cost is critical to
show that limiting competition can improve social welfare.
D. Competition Policy and the No-surcharge Rule
1. Under the No-surcharge Rule
A social planner may determine the number of issuers that maximizes social welfare,
W (f ∗C(n))
17 :
n′ = argmax
n
∫ b¯B
f∗C(n)
[bB + bS − cA − cI − l(n;α)]dH(bB). (4.14)
16Note that α(b¯B + bS− cI − cA)n 32 + 12n−1 is monotonic increasing in [0,∞) while
it is negative for n = 0 and positive for n > n∗.
17It does not include a constant term. The original social welfare function consists
of different components: consumer surplus ν − p − fC(1 − H(fC)) −
∫ fC
bB
bBdH(bB),
merchants’ profit p − d − (m − bS)(1 − H(fC)), and issuers’ profit (fC + fI − cI −
l(n;α))(1−H(fC)).
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Given the number of issuers determined by the social planner, the association sets the
interchange fee and the issuers set the customer fee through determining the quantity
of card payment services.
Let n∗ be the privately optimal number of issuers at α0. Intuitively, since an
increase in the state of technology has the same effect on social welfare like an increase
in competition, the socially optimal number can equal the number of incumbent
issuers for some α > α0.
Let α˜ be the state of technology such that n′ = n∗. Two cases are considered:
(i) n′ < n∗: For α > α˜, the socially optimal number of issuers is less than the
number of incumbent issuers. Intuitively, the rapid developments in technology may
require to lessen the number of incumbent issuers, but the issuers enjoy the technology
developments as long as their profits are positive. Thus, the number of incumbent
issuers can be larger than the socially optimal level. In this case, limiting competition
improves social welfare.
(ii) n∗ < n′: In this case, the socially optimal number of issuers is larger than the
privately optimal number. So, the customer fee will be lower and the interchange fee
will be higher when intervened by the social planner. That is, the privately optimal
output is socially inefficient, and thus an increase in competition improves social
welfare. This case can happen when α < α˜.
Proposition 3. Let α˜ be the state of technology such that n′ = n∗. Given the
number of issuers by n∗, limiting competition improves social welfare for α > α˜; for
α < α˜, increasing competition improves social welfare.
Proposition 3 suggests that limiting competition improves social welfare when
f ∗C(n
∗) < f ∗C(n
′) and f ∗I (n
∗) > f ∗I (n
′) due to the improved state of technology. To
understand how limiting competition can improve social welfare, let suppose that the
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social planner directly sets the fees given the number of issuers by n∗. In this case,
the social planner does not care about the social efficiency of the platform, but the
socially optimal provision of card payment services. Under the no-surcharge rule, the
socially optimal level of the customer fee is
fSC(n
∗;α) = cI + l(n∗;α) + cA − bS,
which is higher than the privately optimal customer fee f ∗C(n
∗;α) for n∗ > 2. So, the
privately optimal interchange fee is higher than the socially optimal level. That is,
the collective determination of the interchange fee even under the no-surcharge rule
lead to an over-provision of card payment services, given the fixed number of issuers.18
Thus, limiting competition so that f ∗C increases and f
∗
I decreases can improve social
welfare.
Proposition 3 also indicates that increasing competition improves social welfare
when α < α˜. In this case, the quantity of card payment services is under-provisioned
due to the cost inefficiency of the platform. It is worth noting that competition
has two effects on the customer fee: improving the cost efficiency of the platform
(∂l(n;α)/∂n < 0) and lowering the customer fee directly.. Thus, an increase in the
cost efficiency of the platform would be larger than a decrease in the customer fee, and
so a rise in competition can increase the under-provisioned quantity of card payment
services.
Without modeling the state of technology, it can be shown that the privately
optimal number of issuers is always less than the socially optimal number of issuers.
So, the privately optimal interchange fee is less than the socially optimal level. That
18See Proposition 3 - (ii) in Rochet and Tirole (2002). They propose that there
would be an equilibrium of fSC < f
∗
C , but I do not have this case in the equilibrium
of the model.
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is, even under the no-surcharge rule, the platform may not internalize positive network
externalities efficiently.
To sum up, competition policy under the no-surcharge rule should depend on the
status of the economy: if the card payment services are over-provisioned, a decrease
in the number of issuers improves social welfare; if they are under-provisioned, an
increase in the number of issuers improves social welfare. In any cases, the privately
optimal fees are likely to differ from the socially optimal level under the no-surcharge
rule.
2. Without the No-surcharge Rule
If the no-surcharge rule is lifted, merchants may surcharge on card payments, resulting
in different prices for card and cash purchases (let pr be the card price and pc be the
cash price). That is, consumers may indirectly observe the interchange fee included
in the retail price for card purchases. Without the no-surcharge rule, consumers’
demand for card purchases depends on the total price of a card payment service,
fC + p
r − pc.
2.1. Merchants’ Responses
Lemma 2. Without the no-surcharge rule, all merchants surcharge on card pay-
ments if m 6= bS in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 is obvious in that the convenience benefit of homogeneous merchants
is the willingness-to-pay price for a card payment service. Therefore, they do not
surcharge on card purchases when m = bS.
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2.2. Issuers’ Responses
Without the no-surcharge rule, the level of the interchange fee is neutral to the quan-
tity of the card payment services since consumers pay fC +p
r−pc for card purchases.
Under the no-surcharge rule, the higher interchange fee followed by the lower cus-
tomer fee increases demand for card purchases, because the effective cost of a card
payment service is not informed to consumers. In contrast, without the no-surcharge
rule, demand for card purchases is determined by fC+p
r−pc, instead of by fC . There-
fore, keeping fC +p
r−pc constant, the lower customer fee and the higher interchange
fee does not affect the quantity of the card payment services in equilibrium.
Though the no-surcharge rule is lifted, issuers are able to collectively determine
the interchange fee rather than compete on fC + p
r − pc. Under the no-surcharge
rule, the levels of the interchange fee are identical regardless of whether they are
collectively determined. However, the collective determination of the interchange fee
within the association can be viewed as a collusion without the no-surcharge rule.
After the no-surcharge rule is lifted, no one is constrained by all merchants accepting
the credit cards so that the non-cooperative interchange fee can be less than the
collusive interchange fee.
Also, the collective determination of the interchange fee can be ruled out by the
social planner. Then, the issuing side competes on the total price fC + fI instead
of the customer fee fC , which is the reason why the restriction on the collective
determination of the interchange fee improves social welfare. After the no-surcharge
rule is lifted, the total price is definitely decreasing in the number of issuers while the
collectively-determined interchange fee is increasing. Thus, prohibiting the collective
determination of the interchange fee leads to competition over the total price, resulting
in an improved social welfare.
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To analyze the effect of the collective determination of the interchange fee within
the association on social welfare, let τ = fC + fI + cA − bS for brevity, which is the
effective price for card purchases. The social welfare without the no-surcharge rule is
given by19:
W (τ) =
∫ b¯B
τ
[bB + bS − cA − cI − l(n;α)]dH(bB). (4.15)
Then, the socially optimal effective fee paid by the consumers with bB ≥ τS is,
τS = cA + cI + l(n;α)− bS,
yielding
fSC + f
S
I = cI + l(n;α), (4.16)
which is called the total (marginal) price for a card payment service in the issuing
side. That is, the optimal social welfare is driven when the total price of a card
payment service equals the marginal cost in the issuing side.
Proposition 4 shows that the implications of abolishing the no-surcharge rule
may depend on whether the association sets the interchange fee collectively.
Proposition 4. Without the no-surcharge rule,
(i) If the association sets the interchange fee, the privately optimal total price is
greater than the socially optimal level so that the card payment services are under-
provisioned.
(ii) Otherwise, the privately optimal total price approaches the socially optimal level
as n→∞.
Proposition 4 - (i) indicates that the abolishment of the no-surcharge rule is not
19It originally consists of different components: consumer surplus (ν−pc)H(τ)(ν−
pr − fC)(1−H(τ))−
∫ τ
bB
bBdH(bB), merchants’ profit (p
c − d(H(τ) + (pr − d−m+
bS)(1−H(tau)), and issuers’ profit (fC + fI − cI − l(n;α))(1−H(τ)).
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enough to attain the socially optimal quantity of card payment services by itself as
long as the interchange fee is set by the association. In this case, an increase in the
number of issuers may improve social welfare, which is described in Proposition 4 -
(ii).
E. Summary
The paper analyzes the issuing side of the credit card industry, and finds that the eco-
nomic principle between competition and price does not hold under the no-surcharge
rule. The no-surcharge rule not only internalizes the positive network externalities
but also restricts competition only on the customer fee. Moreover, the card associ-
ation serves as a barrier for entry and exit. So, the incumbent issuers can be larger
than the socially optimal level so that limiting competition may improve social wel-
fare. If the social planner does not care about the efficiency of the platform like the
model in Rochet and Tirole, the privately optimal customer fee is always less than
the socially optimal level given the fixed number of issuers. So, limiting competition
can improve social welfare.
The paper also shows that the abolishment of the no-surcharge rule leads issuers
to compete on the total fee including the interchange fee unless the association sets the
interchange fee collectively. As a result, the total fee is decreasing with competition,
and so competition may improve social welfare. However, if the association sets the
interchange fee in the absence of the no-surcharge rule, the quantity of the card
payment services are under-provisioned. In this case, a fee policy may improve social
welfare by restricting the collective determination of the interchange fee.
There are several directions for further theoretical researches. For instance, there
are multiple platforms in the real economy. So, any issuers may switch its platform
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with some transfer costs. Moreover, merchants and issuers can be heterogeneous in
convenience benefits and in marginal costs, respectively.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The study examines how firms respond to changes in actual or potential competition,
particularly their responses in pricing. Though competition reduces firms’ market
power so that prices are expected to be lower, firms may still enjoy their market
power to some extent if the market has some characteristics that prevent the forces
of competition from spilling over the market.
The airline industry investigated in Chapter II and Chapter III is characterized
by a price-discriminating market with segments of heterogeneous consumers. So, the
effects of competition on price discrimination can be different depending on whether
firms compete more on one group of consumers than on another group of consumers. I
find that competition may have a positive effect on price discrimination in a case that
firms are more competitive on consumers who are more likely to switch firms. Thus,
when firms face new entry, they would like to reduce lower-end prices much more
than higher-end prices. However, I also find that competition can have a negative
effect on price discrimination when firms face with new entry by low-cost rivals. In
this case, new entry by low-cost rivals can change consumers’ tendencies of switching
firms. As a result, incumbents may be restricted in price discriminating consumers
rather than when they compete with relatively homogeneous competitors. In this cae,
firms reduce higher-end prices much more than lower-end prices, resuling in reducing
price discrimination.
This study has two contributions to the literature of price discrimination. First,
it recognizes the importance of identifying different forces of competition on price
discrimination in the airline industry. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) suggest that the
positive cross-sectional estimate on competition in Borenstein and Rose (1994) may
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suffer from omitted variable biases. However, the opposite results are mainly because
of whether to include low-cost carriers in the analysis. Second, the opposite results
in the literature are not contradictory but both are empirically evident in the in-
dustry. The hypothesis that major airlines price discriminate differently depending
on whether to compete with low-cost carriers, is not rejected. Major airlines reduce
lower-end prices much more than upper-end prices when they compete against one
other, while they reduce upper-end prices to a greater extent when they compete with
low-cost carriers.
Moreover, I find that major airlines may reduce price discrimination responding
to a low-cost carrier’s (Southwest) threat of entry. It is distinguished from the exist-
ing literature in that the analysis focuses on price discrimination (price dispersion)
rather than on the average price. Based on the understanding of entry game as a
signaling game, I identify that the preemptive reduction in price discrimination is for
the purpose of entry deterrence. That is, the low-cost rival can discourage incumbents
from entry deterrence by informing its entry while the incumbents have no motives to
deter the scheduled entry. In contrast, if incumbents are not certain about the rival’s
future entry, they are more likely to persistently reduce price discrimination for entry
deterrence.
The credit card industry analyzed in Chapter IV has also some characteristics
that restricts the effects of competition on prices. First of all, it is a two-sided mar-
ket that requires a platform to interconnect issuers and acquires for card payments.
Furthermore, it has positive network externalities between consumers and merchants,
under the no-surcharge rule that prohibits merchants from setting different prices for
cash and card purchases. As a result, competition among issuers are not effective
in lowering the interchange fee paid by the merchants to the issuers. It is because
the issuers can compensate losses from competing on the issuing side by collectively
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increasing the interchange fee. As long as the issuers in the platform enjoy a positive
profit, no one will not exit the market under the no-surcharge rule. In this case,
limiting the number of issuers can improve social welfare because there would be too
many issuers in the market.
The further researches must be followed in the quest of the relationship of com-
petition and firms’ responses in pricing. The market characteristics that limit the
effects of competition on prices may also exist in other industries so that there would
be similar or different implications on the relationship between competition and firms’
pricing. For instance, the mortgage loan markets are similar to the airline routes in
that consumers are heterogeneous in switching cost and firms can price discriminate
with respect to consumer heterogeneity. In addition, the parametric approaches of
the study do not explain possible non-linear (non-parametric) relationships between
competition and price dispersion. For example, I show that competition can have a
positive effect on price dispersion. However, since lower-end prices can not be lower
than the marginal cost, there would be a threshold from which price dispersion starts
to decrease with competition. Finally, the recent debates on high interchange fees
and the no-surcharge rule in the United States stimulate further investigations on the
effects of competition on interchange fees and the effects of banning the no-surcharge
rule, in a more general case like multiple platforms.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES AND INSTRUMENTS
Variables1
Gloddijt - The Gini log-odds ratio, given by G
lodd
ijt = ln(
Gijt
1−Gijt ), where Gijt is the Gini
coefficient of carrier i’s price distribution on route j in period t, calculated using data
from DB1B. Thr formula is given as in Borenstein and Rose (1994):
G = 1−2×
N∑
m=1
(
farem × PAXm
total revenues
)
×
[
PAXm
total PAX
+
(
1−
m∑
k=1
PAXk
total PAX
)]
,
where N is the number of different fare level tickets reported by a carrier on a route,
farem is the reported fare for the mth ticket, and PAXm is the reported number of
passengers traveling at that fare.
lnP (k)ijt - The logarithm of the kth price percentile of carrier i on route j in
period t, obtained from the DB1B.
lnHERF jt - The logarithm of the Herfindahl index of route j in period t, cal-
culated using passenger shares obtained from the DB1B.
lnNjt - The logarithm of the total number of carriers operating on route j in
period t, obtained from the DB1B.
NLEGjt : The number of legacy carriers on city-pair route j in period t obtained
from the DB1B.
NLCCjt : The number of low-cost carriers (not including regional carriers) on city-
pair route j in period t obtained from the DB1B.
1It is reproduced from Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Borenstein and Rose
(1994).
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lnMKTSHAREijt - The logarithm of the share of total passengers originating
on route j operated by carrier i in period t, calculated from the DB1B.
lnFLTTOT jt - The logarithm of the total number of departures performed on
route j in period t, obtained from the T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
HUBij - A dummy variable indicating whether either the origin or destination
of route j is a hub airport of carrier i.
SMALLj - A dummy variable indicating if both the origin and the destination
airport are not in our list of big cities.
lnTOURIST j - The logarithm of the maximum of the ratio of accommodation
earnings to total non-farm earnings for the origin and destination cities on route j,
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
lnASEATCAP ij - The logarithm of average seat capacity(total available seats
divided by total number of departures) on route j by carrier i obtained from the
T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
Instruments
lnDISTANCEj - The logarithm of non-stop distance in miles between endpoint
airports of route j.
AMEANPOP - The arithmetic mean of the metropolitan population of end-
point cities taken from the 2000 U.S. Census.
GMEANPOP - The geometric mean of the metropolitan population of endpoint
cities taken from the 2000 U.S. Census.
lnPASSRTEjt - The logarithm of total enplaned passengers on route j in period
t from the T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
IRUTHERF - This instrument is identical to one used by Borenstein and Rose
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(1994). This variable is the square of the fitted value for MKTSHAREijt from its
first-stage regression, plus the rescaled sum of the squares of all other carrier’s shares.
See Borenstein and Rose (1994) for a more detailed explanation. It is equal to
̂MKTSHAREijt
2
+
HERFjt −MKTSHARE2ijt
(1−MKTSHAREijt)2 ∗ (1−
̂MKTSHAREijt)2.
GENPSH -
√
ENPj1 ∗ ENPj2/
∑
k
√
ENPk1 ∗ ENPk2, where k indexes all air-
lines, j is the observed airline, and ENPk1 and ENPk2 are airline k’s average quarterly
enplanements at the two endpoint airports. This instrument is similar to one used by
Borenstein and Rose (1994), with the difference being that Borenstein and Rose use
average daily enplanements, while I use average quarterly enplanements, as a result
of data availability. Data on enplanements were obtained from the T-100 Domestic
Segment Databank.
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APPENDIX B
QUARTERLY AND ROLLING CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES
FOR OTHER VARIABLES
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Fig. 10.—Quarterly Cross-sectional Estimates for Major Airlines: The thick line
indicates the estimates in major-carrier routes while the dashed line does the estimates
in mixed-carrier routes. The colored area stands for the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Fig. 11.— Rolling Cross-sectional Estimates for Major Airlines: The thick line
indicates the estimates in major-carrier routes while the dashed line does the estimates
in mixed-carrier routes. The colored area stands for the 95 percent confidence interval.
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APPENDIX C
PRE-ANNOUNCED NON-STOP DESTINATIONS AMONG ROUTES
IMMEDIATELY SERVICED BY SOUTHWEST
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TABLE XIV
Pre-announced Non-stop Destinations among Routes Immediately Serviced
by Southwest
Origin Airport Code Service Started Announced Destination Announced
Long Island, NY (ISP) 03/14/99 Baltimore/Washington 12/09/98*
Chicago Midway
Nashville
Tampa Bay
Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 06/06/99 Baltimore/Washington 03/04/99*
Chicago Midway
Nashville
Tampa Bay
Orlando
Hartford/Springfield, CT (BDL) 10/31/99 Baltimore/Washington 07/13/99*
Chicago Midway
Nashville
Orlando
Albany, NY (ALB) 05/07/00 Baltimore/Washington 01/06/00
Las Vegas 01/18/00*
Orlando
Buffalo/Niagara Falls, NY (BUF) 10/08/00 Baltimore/Washington 06/20/00
Las Vegas
Orlando
Phoenix
West Palm Beach, FL (PBI) 01/21/01 Baltimore/Washington 09/14/00
Nashville 10/19/00*
Tampa Bay
Orlando
Norfolk, VA (ORF) 10/07/01 Baltimore/Washington 05/24/01
Jacksonville 07/24/01*
Las Vegas
Orlando
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 05/09/04 Chicago Midway 10/28/03
Las Vegas 12/11/03*
Phoenix
Orlando
Providence
Tampa Bay
* indicates the date of announcing non-stop flights with fares from the airport.
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APPENDIX D
RESULTS FROM DIFFERENT SAMPLE SELECTIONS
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TABLE XV
Pooling All Threatened Routes
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.006 0.004* 0.004 -0.001 0.002
NLCC -0.000 -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.053*** -0.047***
dp ·NLCC -0.008 -0.011* -0.006 0.009 -0.010
de ·NLCC -0.034** -0.008 -0.004 0.014 -0.017
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) -0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.024 0.013
d(tp − 4) 0.028 -0.008 -0.002 -0.016 0.014
d(tp − 3) 0.004 -0.008 -0.023 -0.048** -0.026
d(tp − 2) -0.040 0.010 0.008 -0.030 -0.029
d(tp − 1) -0.026 0.016 0.008 0.011 -0.019
d(tp) -0.004 -0.027** -0.030** -0.051*** -0.037**
d(tp + 1) -0.075*** 0.007 0.003 -0.065*** -0.075***
d(tp + 2) -0.073*** 0.004 0.006 -0.053*** -0.065***
d(tp + 3) -0.053*** 0.001 -0.019 -0.046** -0.079***
d(tp + 4) -0.049** -0.015 -0.030** -0.059*** -0.086***
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.076*** -0.091***
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) 0.022 -0.167*** -0.161*** -0.165*** -0.168***
d(te + 1) -0.008 -0.207*** -0.230*** -0.246*** -0.212***
d(te + 2) 0.004 -0.251*** -0.261*** -0.294*** -0.294***
d(te + 3) 0.040 -0.244*** -0.250*** -0.222*** -0.231***
d(te + 4) 0.009 -0.234*** -0.216*** -0.237*** -0.237***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) 0.017 -0.197*** -0.171*** -0.180*** -0.181***
Southwest’ Exit(no flights):
d(tx) 0.015 -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.002 -0.016
d(tx + 1) 0.014 -0.045*** -0.040** -0.016 -0.016
d(tx + 2) -0.027 -0.039** -0.027* -0.043* -0.035
d(tx + 3) -0.011 -0.042** -0.031* -0.035 -0.033
d(tx + 4) -0.022 -0.048*** -0.039** -0.046* -0.053**
Bankruptcy -0.101*** -0.015* -0.013 -0.101*** -0.127***
R-square 0.161 0.165 0.151 0.113 0.152
Observations 28,585 28,585 28,585 28,585 28,585
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE XVI
Selecting Major-carrier Routes Over the Sample Period
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG 0.013* -0.005 -0.009 0.004 0.005
NLCC 0.077*** 0.023 0.006 0.084* 0.084***
dp ·NLCC -0.043 -0.052** -0.039* -0.125*** -0.104***
de ·NLCC
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) 0.032 0.047** 0.037 0.073* 0.094**
d(tp − 4) 0.076* 0.011 0.040 0.057 0.082
d(tp − 3) 0.091** 0.010 0.034 0.024 0.152***
d(tp − 2) 0.072* 0.040 0.042 -0.005 0.094*
d(tp − 1) 0.049 0.077** 0.069* 0.080* 0.118**
d(tp) 0.081** 0.016 -0.017 -0.050 0.012
d(tp + 1) 0.033 0.031 -0.009 -0.009 -0.018
d(tp + 2) -0.023 -0.006 0.006 -0.046 -0.037
d(tp + 3) 0.018 -0.033 -0.071** -0.052 -0.116**
d(tp + 4) 0.056 -0.052* -0.045 -0.016 -0.013
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) 0.003 -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.116***
Bankruptcy -0.030 0.010 0.015 -0.050 -0.017
R-square 0.167 0.171 0.167 0.114 0.186
Observations 4,661 4,661 4,661 4,661 4,661
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE XVII
Selecting Major-carrier Routes Before Threatened by Southwest
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.004 -0.004 -0.008** -0.010* -0.011**
NLCC -0.015 0.003 0.012 0.011 -0.006
dp ·NLCC 0.011 -0.035** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.042
de ·NLCC -0.045* -0.008 -0.018 -0.028 -0.028
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) 0.002 0.069*** 0.061** 0.128*** 0.101**
d(tp − 4) 0.001 0.080** 0.065** 0.045 0.081
d(tp − 3) 0.003 0.074** 0.039 0.005 0.050
d(tp − 2) -0.017 0.089*** 0.071** 0.058 0.057
d(tp − 1) 0.007 0.082*** 0.074** 0.103** 0.065*
d(tp) 0.029 0.022 0.014 0.043 0.045
d(tp + 1) -0.051* 0.036 0.046** -0.015 -0.016
d(tp + 2) -0.079*** 0.051** 0.047** -0.027 -0.018
d(tp + 3) -0.064*** 0.057*** 0.036* -0.002 -0.044
d(tp + 4) -0.062** 0.025 0.002 -0.064* -0.076**
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.009 -0.015 -0.027* -0.070*** -0.039
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) 0.125*** -0.193*** -0.186*** -0.155*** -0.097***
d(te + 1) 0.110** -0.332*** -0.386*** -0.313*** -0.233***
d(te + 2) 0.113* -0.346*** -0.361*** -0.324*** -0.302***
d(te + 3) 0.202*** -0.313*** -0.353*** -0.228*** -0.200***
d(te + 4) 0.170*** -0.315*** -0.333*** -0.229*** -0.195***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) 0.162*** -0.250*** -0.219*** -0.179*** -0.130***
Southwest’ Exit(no flights):
d(tx) 0.089** -0.089*** -0.104*** -0.021 0.038
d(tx + 1) 0.077* -0.071** -0.075** -0.042 0.010
d(tx + 2) 0.020 -0.078** -0.060** -0.058* -0.020
d(tx + 3) 0.036 -0.072** -0.053* -0.047 -0.030
d(tx + 4) 0.054 -0.076*** -0.060** -0.033 0.021
Bankruptcy 0.026 -0.009 -0.012 -0.060** -0.018
R-square 0.176 0.174 0.170 0.113 0.125
Observations 9,953 9,953 9,953 9,953 9,953
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE XVIII
Selecting Mixed-carrier Routes Before Threatened by Southwest
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.012** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.004 0.009
NLCC -0.002 -0.029*** -0.040*** -0.058*** -0.049***
dp ·NLCC -0.012 -0.011 -0.000 0.019* -0.011
de ·NLCC -0.015 -0.030* -0.024 0.009 -0.031
Southwest’ Presence:
d(tp − 8 to tp − 5) -0.006 -0.035** -0.034** -0.035 -0.042
d(tp − 4) 0.028 -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.044
d(tp − 3) -0.015 -0.053*** -0.075*** -0.106*** -0.114***
d(tp − 2) -0.075** -0.032* -0.034* -0.085*** -0.104***
d(tp − 1) -0.057** -0.036** -0.043*** -0.060** -0.095***
d(tp) -0.037 -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.107*** -0.082***
d(tp + 1) -0.126*** -0.011 -0.020 -0.113*** -0.125***
d(tp + 2) -0.088*** -0.007 -0.017 -0.068*** -0.098***
d(tp + 3) -0.068** -0.016 -0.036* -0.070** -0.082***
d(tp + 4) -0.070** -0.023 -0.047** -0.069** -0.109***
d(tp + 5 to tp + 12) -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.046*** -0.062*** -0.105***
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) -0.063** -0.136*** -0.128*** -0.157*** -0.215***
d(te + 1) -0.086*** -0.128*** -0.133*** -0.201*** -0.202***
d(te + 2) -0.077** -0.182*** -0.192*** -0.282*** -0.294***
d(te + 3) -0.077** -0.190*** -0.175*** -0.222*** -0.252***
d(te + 4) -0.094*** -0.178*** -0.136*** -0.233*** -0.252***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) -0.087*** -0.152*** -0.129*** -0.176*** -0.211***
Southwest’ Exit(no flights):
d(tx) -0.035 -0.021 -0.018 0.010 -0.056**
d(tx + 1) -0.034 -0.034 -0.017 0.018 -0.039
d(tx + 2) -0.061* -0.020 -0.011 -0.027 -0.050
d(tx + 3) -0.047 -0.035 -0.021 -0.019 -0.038
d(tx + 4) -0.074** -0.039 -0.031 -0.054 -0.098***
Bankruptcy -0.158*** -0.011 -0.005 -0.112*** -0.175***
R-square 0.194 0.207 0.192 0.158 0.214
Observations 13,719 13,719 13,719 13,719 13,719
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE XIX
Selecting All Immediately-serviced Routes
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.024*** 0.010** 0.009* -0.006 -0.004
NLCC 0.046*** -0.010 -0.017 -0.021* 0.007
dp ·NLCC -0.117*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.058** 0.091***
de ·NLCC -0.061*** -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.038**
Southwest’ Announcement:
d(te − 8 to te − 5) 0.005 0.010 0.013 0.051 0.016
d(te − 4) 0.058 0.020 0.039 0.095*** 0.078**
d(te − 3) -0.007 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.124*** 0.080**
d(te − 2) 0.035 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.176*** 0.145***
d(te − 1) -0.009 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.159*** 0.105***
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) -0.094*** -0.062*** -0.104*** -0.179*** -0.144***
d(te + 1) -0.131*** -0.106*** -0.141*** -0.257*** -0.228***
d(te + 2) -0.137*** -0.096*** -0.148*** -0.237*** -0.233***
d(te + 3) -0.118*** -0.097*** -0.131*** -0.224*** -0.225***
d(te + 4) -0.096*** -0.102*** -0.111*** -0.169*** -0.177***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.124*** -0.172*** -0.174***
Southwest’ Exit(no flights):
d(tx) -0.090 -0.221*** -0.240*** -0.175*** -0.329***
d(tx + 1) -0.166** -0.057 -0.122* -0.140*** -0.194***
d(tx + 2) -0.114 0.015 -0.035 -0.037 -0.082*
d(tx + 3) -0.091 0.010 -0.039 -0.005 -0.057
d(tx + 4) -0.036 -0.011 -0.022 0.018 0.052
Bankruptcy -0.213*** -0.015 -0.020 -0.124*** -0.168***
R-square 0.150 0.234 0.287 0.340 0.343
Observations 13,863 13,863 13,863 13,863 13,863
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE XX
Selecting Mixed-carrier Routes before Immediately Serviced by Southwest
Glodd lnP (10) lnP (20) lnP (80) lnP (90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLEG -0.028*** 0.017*** 0.015** -0.005 -0.003
NLCC 0.038** -0.004 -0.010 -0.014 0.009
dp ·NLCC -0.087*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.040* 0.077***
de ·NLCC -0.055** -0.022 -0.016 -0.021 -0.051***
Southwest’ Announcement:
d(te − 8 to te − 5) -0.010 -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.035
d(te − 4) 0.050 -0.067* -0.052 -0.034 -0.023
d(te − 3) -0.031 0.029 0.003 -0.010 -0.038
d(te − 2) -0.010 0.050* 0.028 0.052 0.013
d(te − 1) -0.089*** 0.066** 0.044 0.045 -0.013
Southwest’ Actual Entry:
d(te) -0.099** -0.067** -0.109*** -0.177*** -0.150***
d(te + 1) -0.145*** -0.123*** -0.157*** -0.301*** -0.257***
d(te + 2) -0.156*** -0.095*** -0.156*** -0.274*** -0.254***
d(te + 3) -0.099*** -0.121*** -0.149*** -0.236*** -0.233***
d(te + 4) -0.092** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.148*** -0.183***
d(te + 5 to te + 8) -0.117*** -0.145*** -0.157*** -0.177*** -0.194***
Southwest’ Exit(no flights):
d(tx) -0.115* -0.198*** -0.218*** -0.159*** -0.314***
d(tx + 1) -0.191** -0.035 -0.108* -0.132*** -0.186***
d(tx + 2) -0.124* 0.028 -0.035 -0.038 -0.087*
d(tx + 3) -0.120 0.024 -0.030 -0.014 -0.076
d(tx + 4) -0.073 0.001 -0.010 -0.001 0.033
Bankruptcy -0.172*** -0.006 0.007 -0.090*** -0.134***
R-square 0.123 0.283 0.322 0.336 0.333
Observations 7,782 7,782 7,782 7,782 7,782
Notes: 1) All regressions include time dummies and quarter dummies. The carrier-route-specific effects are treated
as fixed. Standard errors are in parenthesis are clustered by route.
2) *, **, and *** indicate that the estimators are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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APPENDIX E
EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP OF COMPETITION AND
INTERCHANGE FEES
Fig. 12.—Empirical Relationship of Competition and Interchange Fees: The average
interchange fee is calculated from Visa USA; the Herfindahl index for competition
measure is calculated using data for the twenty largest issuers. The shaded area roughly
indicates the period of Citibank’s switching to MasterCard from Visa.
Source: Figure 5 in Weiner and Wright (2005).
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APPENDIX F
PROOFS
 Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Suppose that both merchants accept credit cards.
For given prices (pi, pj), merchant i’s market share among consumers with bB ≥ f ∗C
is given by pi + tx
r
i = pj + t(1 − xri ). Similarly, merchant i’s market share among
consumers with bB < f
∗
C is also given by pi + tx
c
i = pj + t(1− xci). Then, merchant i
solves
max
pi
(pi − d)
(
1
2
+
pj − pi
2t
)
H(f ∗C) + (pi − d−m+ bS)
(
1
2
+
pj − pi
2t
)
(1−H(f ∗C))
yielding at equilibrium
p∗ = t+ d(m− bS)(1−H(f ∗C)), (F.1)
pi∗ =
t
2
. (F.2)
To see if some merchant has an incentive to deviate from this proposed equilibrium,
suppose now that merchant i does not to accept credit cards. Then, merchant i’s
market share (xci) among consumers with bB < f
∗
C is given by pi + tx
c
i = pj + t(1−xci)
while its market share (xri ) among cardholders with bB ≥ f ∗C is given by pi + txri =
pj + t(1− xri )− bB + f ∗C . Aggregating over all consumers, merchant i’s market share
is
xi =
(
1
2
+
pj − pi
2t
)
H(fC) +
∫ b¯B
f∗C
(
1
2
+
pj − pi − bB + fC
2t
)
dH(bB)
=
1
2
+
1
2t
[pj − pi −D(fC)(β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)] .
So, merchant i solves
max
pi
[(pi − d)xi] ,
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yielding
pi =
1
2
[pj + t+ d−D(f ∗C)(β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)]. (F.3)
On the other hand, merchant j taking cards solves
max
pj
[
(pj − d)
(
1
2
+
pi − pj
2t
)
H(f ∗C)
+ (pj − d−m+ bS)
(
1
2
+
pi − pj + β(f ∗C)− f ∗C
2t
)
(1−H(f ∗C))
]
,
yielding
pj =
1
2
[pi + t+ d+D(f
∗
C)(β(f
∗
C)− f ∗C +m− bS)]. (F.4)
The equilibrium prices are obtained by solving merchants’ best response function
(F.3) and (F.4):
pi = t+ d+
1
3
D(f ∗C)[(m− bS)− (β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)],
pj = t+ d+
1
3
D(f ∗C)[2(m− bS) + (β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)]
Each merchant’s profit is given by
pii =
1
2t
{
t+
1
3
D(f ∗C)[(m− bS)− (β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)]
}2
, (F.5)
pij =
1
2t
{
t− 1
3
D(f ∗C)[(m− bS)− (β(f ∗C)− f ∗C)]
}2
− 1
2t
(m− bS)[β(f ∗C)− f ∗C ]D(f ∗C)[1−D(f ∗C)]. (F.6)
Thus, merchant i’s not accepting the cards would be profitable (pii > t/2) if and only
if 2
β(f ∗C)− f ∗C < m− bS.
Given that merchant i does not accept the cards, merchant j does not accept
2See Lemma 2 in Rochet and Tirole (2002): The set of the interchange fee such
that all merchants reject the card is included in (f
I
,∞), where f
I
≡ bS − cA.
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the cards since its profit is less than t/2 when it accepts the cards. Therefore, there
are only symmetric equilibria of all merchants accepting the cards or all merchants
rejecting depending on whether β(f ∗C)− f ∗C ≥ m− bS or not.
Let f ∗C = f
∗
C(cI − f¯I) where f¯I is the interchange fee such that β(f ∗C(cI − f¯I))−
f ∗C(cI−f¯I) = f¯I+cA−bS. Given this, issuers may set the interchange fee slightly below
f¯I , and then all merchants choose to accept the card. Furthermore, if merchant i are
indifferent in accepting or not accepting the cards, both merchants are more likely to
choose to accept the cards since accepting the cards provides high-quality services to
consumers with bB > fC .
To see whether f¯I is unique, let ψ(fI) be as a function of the differences of the
both sides of (4.7)3 :
ψ(fI) = fI + cA − bS − β(f ∗C(cI − fI)) + f ∗c (cI − fI). (F.7)
It is sufficient to show that ψ(fI) is monotonic increasing within an interval of fI .
The first-order derivative of (F.7) with respect to fI is given by
∂ψ(fI)
∂fI
= 1− (∂β(f
∗
C)
∂f ∗C
− 1)∂f
∗
C
∂fI
= 1 +
1
2
∂f ∗C
∂fI
.
which is monotonic increasing if ∂f ∗C/∂fI > −2. From (4.10), ∂f ∗C/∂fI = −n/(n+1) ∈
(−1, 0). By the definition of f¯I , ψ(fI) > 0 for fI > f¯I while ψ(fI) < 0 for fI < f¯I .
(ii) It is sufficient that the unconstrained profit function is increasing over the in-
terchange fee. Since the association is constrained by the condition that all merchants
accept the platform cards, the largest interchange fee that satisfies the constraint will
be the equilibrium interchange fee.
3In equilibrium, f ∗C is a function of cI − fI . See the equation (F.11).
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Let pitotal be the total profit of issuers which is given by
pitotal = (f ∗C(cI − fI) + fI − cI − l(n;α))(1−H(f ∗C(cI − fI)). (F.8)
The first-order derivative of (F.8) with respect to fI is
∂pitotal
∂fI
= (
∂f ∗C
∂fI
+ 1)(1−H(f ∗C))− (f ∗C + fI − cI)h(f ∗C)
∂f ∗C
∂fI
.
It can be shown that ∂pitotal/∂fI > 0 if
−1 ≤ ∂f
∗
C
∂fI
< 0
which is satisfied with the first-order derivative of (4.10). Thus, the equilibrium
interchange fee will be the largest interchange fee to satisfy (4.7).
 Proof of Proposition 1. Given fI ≤ f¯I , an issuer under a Cournot Oligopoly
sets the quantity of card payment services non-cooperatively to maximize its own
profit:
max
qi
(b¯B − k
n∑
j=1
qj + fI − cI − l(n;α))qi. (F.9)
The first-order condition with respect to qi is
b¯B + fI − cI − l(n;α)− k
n∑
j 6=i
qi − 2kqi = 0.
Since issuers are symmetric,
q∗ =
1
k(n+ 1)
(b¯B + fI − cI − l(n;α)). (F.10)
Plugging (F.9) into (F.7) yields
f ∗C =
1
(n+ 1)
b¯B − n
(n+ 1)
(fI − cI − l(n;α)). (F.11)
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From (4.7), (4.8), and (F.11), the fees in equilibrium are given by
f ∗C(n) = b¯B −
2n
(n+ 2)
(b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA),
f ∗I (n) = cI + l(n;α)− b¯B +
2(n+ 1)
(n+ 2)
(b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA).
Let g(n) = b¯B + bS − cI − l(n;α)− cA for simplicity. The first-order derivatives
of (4.10) and (4.11) with respect to n are
∂f ∗C(n)
∂n
= − 4
(n+ 2)2
g(n) +
2n
(n+ 2)
∂l(n;α)
∂n
< 0,
and
∂f ∗I (n)
∂n
=
2
(n+ 2)2
g(n)− n
(n+ 2)
∂l(n;α)
∂n
> 0.
since g(n) > 0 for all n and ∂l(n;α)/∂n < 0.
 Proof of Proposition 2. The first-order condition for maximizing (4.13) with
respect to n is
∂pii(n)
∂n
=
8
k(n+ 2)2
g(n)
[
g′(n)− g(n)
(n+ 2)
]
= 0.
Then, the optimal number of issuers, n∗, solves g′(n) = g(n)/(n + 2).4 The second-
order condition is given by
∂2pii(n)
∂n2
=
8
k(n+ 2)2
[(
2g(n)
(n+ 2)
− g′(n)
)2
− g(n)
2
(n+ 2)2
+ g(n)g′′(n)
]
,
which is negative at n∗ since g′(n∗) = g(n∗)/(n∗+ 2), g(n∗) > 0 and g′′(n∗) < 0. Note
that the condition for a global maximizer is ∂2pii(n)/∂n
2, which is equivalent to the
condition that (2g(n)/(n+ 2)− g′(n))2 < g(n)2/(n+ 2)2 − g(n)g′′(n)
 Proof of Proposition 3. The first-order derivative of (4.14) with respect to n
4Let φ(n) = g′(n) − g(n)/(n + 2). Unless g′′(n) < g′(n)/(n + 2) − g(n)/(n + 2)2
for all n, there exist n 6= n∗ that solve φ(n) = 0.
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is given by
∂W (f ∗C(n))
∂n
=
1
k
{
(b¯B − f ∗C(n)− g(n))
∂f ∗C(n)
∂n
+ g′(n)(b¯B − f ∗I (n))
}
. (F.12)
Plugging (4.10) into (F.12) yields
∂W (f ∗C(n))
∂n
=
1
k
{
n− 2
n+ 2
g(n)
∂f ∗C(n)
∂n
+
2n
n+ 2
g′(n)g(n)
}
.
Using ∂f ∗C(n)/∂n,
∂W (f ∗C(n))
∂n
=
4
k(n+ 2)3
g(n)
{
−n− 2
n+ 2
g(n)2 + 2ng′(n)g(n)
}
= 0. (F.13)
By the definition of α˜, the first-order condition (F.13) is satisfied at n = n∗ and
α = α˜:
∂W (f ∗C(n;α))
∂n
|n=n∗,α=α˜ = 0,
which is equivalent to
− n
∗ − 2
n∗ + 2
g(n∗; α˜) + 2n
∂g(n∗; α˜)
∂n
= 0. (F.14)
Since ∂g(n)/∂α > 0 and ∂g(n)/∂n∂α < 0, the condition (F.14) becomes negative for
α > α˜:
∂W (f ∗C(n;α))
∂n
|n=n∗,α>α˜ < 0.
For α < α˜, the condition (F.14) becomes positive for α > α˜:
∂W (f ∗C(n;α))
∂n
|n=n∗,α<α˜ > 0.
Therefore, the socially optimal number of issuers is less than the number of
issuers for α > α˜:
n′ < n∗.
For α < α˜, it is greater than n∗.
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 Proof of Lemma 2. Since there is no reason to reject the card after lifting the
no-surcharge rule, merchant i solves
max
pci ,p
r
i
[
(pci − d)(
1
2
+
pcj − pci
2t
)H(fC + p
r − pc)
+ (pri − d−m+ bS)(
1
2
+
prj − pri
2t
)(1−H(fC + pr − pc))
]
,
where pc and pr denote cash and card prices, respectively. If both merchants decide
to surcharge on card payment, then the prices will be given by
pc = t+ d,
pr = t+ d+m− bS.
Each merchant’s profit is equal to
pi∗ =
t
2
.
To see whether surcharging on card payments is an equilibrium, suppose now
that merchant i decides not to surcharge on card payment. Then, merchant i’ market
share among each groups of consumers are determined by
pi + tx
c
i = p
c
j + t(1− xci) among consumers with bB < fC + pr − pc,
pi + tx
r
i = p
r
j + t(1− xri ) among consumers with bB ≥ fC + pr − pc.
It can be shown that merchant i and j set the prices such that
pcj < pi < p
r
j ,
where pi = t+d+(m−bS)(1−H(fC+pr−pc)), pcj = t+d+ 12(m−bS)(1−H(fC+pr−pc)),
and prj = t+ d+ (m− bS)(1−H(fC + pr − pc)) + 12(m− bS)H(fC + pr − pc). Then,
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merchant i and j obtain profits as follow:
pii =
t
2
− 1
4t
(m− bS)2H(fC + pr − pc)(1−H(fC + pr − pc))
pij =
t
2
+
1
8t
(m− bS)2H(fC + pr − pc)(1−H(fC + pr − pc)).
Therefore, merchant i has no incentives to deviate from surcharging on card
payments unless m = bS. Though m = bS, each merchant’s profit is t/2, respectively.
Therefore, merchants are more likely to surcharge on card payments for providing
high-quality services to consumers who benefit from using the cards.
 Proposition 4 . (i) Let f ∗∗C be the equilibrium customer fee in a symmetric
Cournot oligopoly. The association solves
max
fI
[f ∗∗C + fI − cI − l(n;α)] [1−H(f ∗∗C + fI + cA − bS)] . (F.15)
The first-order condition of (F.15) is
1− 1
k
(f ∗∗C + fI − cI − l(n;α)− bB)−
1
k
(f ∗∗C + fI − cI − l(n;α)) = 0,
yielding
f ∗∗C + f
∗∗
I = cI + l(n;α) +
1
2
b¯B. (F.16)
Since f ∗∗C +f
∗∗
I > f
S
C +f
S
I , the quantity of card payment services is under-provisioned
:
1−H(cI + l(n;α) + 1
2
b¯B + cA − bS) < 1−H(cI + l(n;α) + cA − bS)
(ii) Since the demand for card payment services is
D(fC + fI + cA − bS) = 1− 1
k
(fC + fI + cA − bS − bB),
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the inverse demand function is given by
fC + fI = b¯B + bS − cA − k
n∑
j=1
qj.
Then, each issuer solves
max
qi
(b¯B + bS − cA − k
n∑
j=1
qj)qi.
The first-order condition with respect to qi is
b¯B + bS − cA − cI − l(n;α)− k
n∑
j 6=i
qj − 2kqi = 0.
Since issuers are symmetric,
q∗∗ =
1
k(n+ 1)
(b¯B + bS − cA − cI − l(n;α)), (F.17)
(fC + fI)
∗∗ = cI + l(n;α) +
1
n+ 1
(b¯B + bS − cA − cI − l(n;α)). (F.18)
Therefore, it is obvious that
lim
n→∞
(fC + fI)
∗∗ = cI + l(∞)
= τS.
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